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ABSTRACT 
Kathleen Lawlor: Impacts of Poverty Reduction Programs in Remote Rural Landscapes: 
Evidence from Cash Transfers in Zambia 
(Under the direction of Sudhanshu Handa) 
This dissertation, composed of three studies, examines the potential for unconditional 
cash transfers to reduce poverty in rural Africa and considers the serious challenges posed by 
weak market access, natural resource dependence, and climate shocks that threaten food 
supplies. To investigate these questions we harness the randomized roll-out of Zambia’s Child 
Grant Program, which extends – unconditionally – payments of 60 kwacha (about $12) per 
month to households with a child under the age of five. 
We find that these relatively small cash payments are transformative for rural Zambian 
households in numerous ways. First, cash transfers empower poor, rural households facing 
weather and other negative income shocks to employ coping strategies typically used by the non-
poor, such as spending savings. The transfers also enable households to substantially increase 
their food consumption and overall food security over time, despite widespread drought and 
flooding. Second, cash transfers allow households to expand their farms. Third, the income 
effects of cash are powerful enough to shift livelihood strategies and convert subsistence farmers 
into small-scale farmers that sell some fraction of their crops in markets, purchase agricultural 
inputs, and own non-farm businesses.  
However, there is significant impact heterogeneity moderated by households’ market 
access. We find that while cash is more transformative than bicycle ownership (which can 
facilitate market access) in terms of converting subsistence farmers into small-scale sellers,
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bicycles can empower households already engaged in agricultural markets to increase their crop 
sales over time – even in the context of declining crop revenues. We also find that cash has a 
greater impact on farm expansion for households living far from markets, while households 
living close to markets are more likely to use the transfer to start non-farm businesses and 
consume charcoal.  
These three studies provide evidence that unconditional cash transfers facilitate rural 
households’ autonomous adaptation and development decisions and these decisions are helping 
households escape poverty, despite challenges posed by climate change and remoteness. 
However, the productive impacts of cash transfers in rural areas could be enhanced by 
complementary initiatives that improve market access and promote sustainable use of natural 
resources. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
1.1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, numerous econometric studies have investigated the effectiveness 
of cash transfer programs in reducing poverty in developing countries. This large and growing 
body of evidence reveals that cash transfers are highly effective in reducing poverty in various 
countries across the world (Journal of Development Effectiveness, 2010). Cash transfer 
programs, which extend regular cash grants to poor households, are designed to relieve the 
immediate acute effects of extreme poverty and break the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty to children. Many of the most studied and well-known cash transfer programs, such as 
Mexico’s Progresa (now known as Oportunidades) and Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, make the 
extension of payments conditional on children’s health clinic visits as well as school enrollment 
and attendance.  
The main goal of cash transfer programs is social protection, with a specific focus on 
improving children’s welfare and well-being. Blank et al. (2010) review several definitions of 
social protection and note that most definitions emphasize the reduction of households’ 
vulnerability to economic shocks, which enables them to “protect” their consumption and 
achieve a minimum standard of living, above that of extreme poverty. The general theory of 
change motivating conditional cash transfer programs is that parents require a pecuniary 
incentive to vaccinate their children or enroll them in school and the payments provide 
households with cash they can use to buy more nutritious food for themselves and their children.
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Taken together, the cash plus conditions should lead to an improvement in children’s human 
capital and ability to escape poverty over the long-term.  
Economic theory suggests that conditions attached to transfers change the relative prices 
of goods and thus introduce substitution effects that affect behavior. This behavior may be 
economically efficient, if cash encourages households to consume more of a good that is socially 
beneficial (i.e., has positive externalities), such as childhood vaccinations, than they would have 
in the absence of this incentive. However, economic theory also suggests that conditionalities 
may be inefficient for multiple reasons. Because compliance with conditions imposes transaction 
and opportunity costs on households, there is risk of adverse selection, where only those who 
would have taken the obliged actions anyways opt-in to the program (because their costs of 
compliance are minimal). Additionally, there are real programmatic costs associated with 
monitoring compliance with conditions and these program expenditures could instead be spent 
on increasing the size of the transfer or enrolling more beneficiaries. For these reasons and 
others, cash transfer programs in Africa tend to be unconditional, though the focus remains on 
social protection for children.1 
Beyond protecting households’ consumption and children’s human capital, cash transfer 
programs also have significant potential to contribute to poverty reduction more broadly. For 
example, if households use the cash grants to increase agricultural production and sell their 
production and labor in markets, cash transfers could push households onto self-propelled 
growth trajectories that allow them to escape poverty. Particularly in Africa, where the depth of 
                                                
1While some studies find that conditional programs produce better outcomes for children’s health and schooling 
(e.g., Baird et al., 2011, Attanasio et al., 2015), others question the methodological rigor of these studies (e.g., Kidd 
and Calder, 2012) and many of the first generation evaluations of unconditional cash transfers in Africa are 
identifying positive impacts on children’s health and schooling (UNICEF Office of Research-Innocenti, 2014) as 
well as reductions in risky sexual behavior amongst youth (Handa et al., 2014(a)).  
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poverty is especially severe2 and there are few employment opportunities, these small infusions 
of cash have the potential to be transformative.  
Historically, poverty reduction programs in low-income countries have focused on 
targeted sector interventions, including in-kind transfers of livestock, agricultural inputs, 
improved cookstoves, or other assets; training in agricultural techniques, health practices, or 
small-business development; supply-side interventions to increase the quantity and quality of 
educational and health care facilities; and the extension of microcredit. However, as Blattman 
and Niehaus (2014) observe, evidence is accumulating that many of these targeted sector 
interventions have seriously underperformed.3 When put in this larger historical context, cash 
transfers – conditional or not – clearly represent a revolutionary approach to fighting poverty.   
All of these approaches are based on certain assumptions – explicitly or implicitly – 
about what works to reduce poverty. Implicitly, traditional development interventions that give 
in-kind transfers rather than cash are suggesting that donors/governments/NGOs know what the 
poor need to get out of poverty – and they know better than the poor themselves. Supply-side 
interventions assume there is existing demand for education and health services that is not being 
met due to lack of infrastructure, whereas educational training programs assume demand is 
lacking and technological adoption and agricultural output low due to a lack of information. And 
while the explicit assumption guiding microcredit approaches is obviously that the poor are 
credit-constrained, the implicit assumption – given the way microcredit lending operates – is that 
                                                
2Nearly half of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population lives in extreme poverty (measured as living on less than 
$1.25/day) (World Bank (2013(a)). Rural poverty remains particularly severe on the continent; in some African 
countries 90% of those living below the poverty line reside in rural areas (Chen and Ravallion, 2007). 
 
3For example, recent evidence from six randomized evaluations of microcredit programs implemented across the 
developing world reveals that microcredit does not increase household consumption or income (see Banerjee et al., 
2015). 
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poverty is perpetuated by a lack of credit for profit-making endeavors, rather than a lack of credit 
and finance for basic needs.  
In contrast, an unconditional cash transfer approach might assume that the poor 
themselves are best placed to decide how small amounts of development finance should be spent 
in order to improve their lives; that demand for health care, education, and improved 
technologies is low due to income constraints; and that an inability to satisfy basic needs – rather 
than start a small business – is the major force perpetuating poverty, with food consumption and 
agricultural production constrained by a lack of income, credit, and savings.  
Cash transfers could potentially be more effective in reducing poverty than targeted 
sector interventions for several reasons. First, it may be that the primary constraint on household 
agricultural production, market engagement, and savings is income, rather than information. 
Second, because cash transfers enable the poor themselves to decide what changes to make to 
their livelihood strategies, this could allow those who are more entrepreneurial to diversify their 
livelihoods beyond farming, while also allowing those more skilled at agriculture to expand their 
farms. From an economic standpoint, such self-selection could lead to efficiency gains as well as 
avoid saturation of agricultural markets by enabling diversification of livelihoods at the local 
level. Finally, because cash transfers respect individual’s autonomy and agency and empower the 
poor to make their own decisions, transfers could be more effective than traditional sector 
approaches at tackling multiple dimensions of poverty, including capability deprivation and lack 
of voice, choice, and action (per Sen, 1999). 
However, questions remain about the effectiveness of cash transfers in achieving 
development impacts beyond protection of children’s human capital. Unconditional cash 
transfers, in particular, face skepticism; some worry that the poor won’t use the money to protect 
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children’s human capital or that the transfers won’t be put towards productive uses and will 
instead foster dependency and idleness (Blattman and Niehaus, 2014). Additionally, cash transfer 
programs’ emphasis on the demand side might cause these programs to overlook important 
supply-side constraints that hinder households’ ability to convert cash transfers into health visits, 
education, or purchases. Supply-side constraints could also cause cash transfers to induce 
localized inflation if, for example, a rising demand for food cannot be met by increased 
agricultural production. In rural Africa, supply-side constraints may be particularly problematic. 
Experience with cash transfers in remote rural areas of Africa is still being tested (Davis 
et al., 2012). As the “last frontier” of global poverty eradication (World Bank, 2013(a)), these 
settings face unique challenges given weak market access (Barrett et al., 2001) and the complex 
poverty-environment relationships that characterize agricultural communities living on less-
favored lands (Barbier, 2010). Moreover, these challenges facing rural Africa will only be 
compounded in coming years by the erratic weather patterns induced by climate change, which 
are predicted to take devastating tolls on rain-fed agriculture and food security in Africa (IPCC, 
2014).  
All of these characteristics of rural Africa suggest strong potential for poverty traps – the 
self-reinforcing conditions that cause poverty to persist (Dasgupta, 1997). For example, 
subsistence farmers coping with drought and a failed harvest may have no other choice but to 
reduce food consumption, given a lack of savings, liquidity, and credit (Zimmerman and Carter, 
2003; World Bank, 2013(b)). Such short-term coping strategies can lead to malnutrition and the 
degradation of human capital, especially children’s, weakening their ability to escape poverty 
over the long-run.4 Similarly, poor communities dependent on natural resources for farming and 
                                                
4Grantham-McGregor et al. (2007) estimate that early childhood malnutrition in developing countries reduces 
individuals’ lifetime earnings by 22 percent. 
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livelihoods may degrade their natural capital in an effort to improve their situation, thereby 
pushing themselves farther into poverty (Barbier, 2010). Finally, weak infrastructure and limited 
market access in rural areas pose significant supply-side constraints on the rural poor’s ability to 
escape poverty, suggesting the existence of “fractal poverty traps” (Barrett and Swallow, 2005). 
In this context of multiple poverty traps, many of which repeat and reinforce themselves at 
multiple scales (from the household to the community to the region), can cash transfers be an 
effective development tool? 
The many unconditional cash transfer programs currently being implemented in rural 
Africa offer fertile ground for investigating the impacts of cash transfers beyond protection of 
children’s health and education to include examination of impacts on household agricultural 
production, market participation, and income generation. These programs also provide an 
opportunity to critically assess whether cash transfers can work to reduce poverty in the context 
of potential poverty traps posed by weak market access, natural resource dependence, and 
climate shocks that threaten food supplies.  
This dissertation, composed of three studies, investigates these questions using data from 
the randomized roll-out of an unconditional cash transfer program currently being implemented 
in Zambia, the Zambia Child Grant Program.  
1.2. Randomized impact evaluation of the Zambia Child Grant Program   
The Zambian Child Grant Program is an unconditional cash transfer program being 
implemented by Zambia’s Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child Health. The 
goals of the program are to reduce extreme poverty and the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty to children. To be eligible for the program, households must have a child under the age 
of five. Enrolled households receive the equivalent of about $12 per month, which is estimated to 
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be the cost of purchasing one meal per day for an average-sized household for a month. The 
Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child Health began implementing the 
program in 2010, in three districts with the highest rates of child mortality and malnutrition in 
Zambia: Kalabo, Kaputa, and Shongombo. These districts are extremely remote, situated more 
than two days car travel from the country’s capital, Lusaka.  
Zambia’s Child Grant Program is being rolled out in phases, enabling the program to first 
conduct a rigorous evaluation of the pilot phase before scaling up. The evaluation employs a 
multi-site, clustered randomized design. Thirty communities from each of three districts were 
first randomly assigned to either treatment or control status. All eligible households within 
treatment communities were then enrolled in the program. Next, 28 households from each 
control and treatment community were randomly selected to participate in the study. Baseline 
surveys were administered prior to randomly assigning communities to treatment or control 
status and the start of the program. In sum, in 2010, baseline data were collected from 2,515 
households living in 90 communities (45 control, 45 treatment) across Kaputa, Kalabo, and 
Shangombo. A second round of data was collected in 2012.  
In addition to collecting detailed information on children’s health and schooling, 
households were asked about their consumption, income, assets, agricultural production, and 
other livelihood activities. Households were also surveyed about their exposure to a long list of 
potential negative income shocks as well as their specific coping strategies. Households in the 
sample are quite poor, with 92% living below the poverty line5 and 90% ranking as severely food 
insecure. The vast majority are subsistence farmers, farming, on average, less than 1 hectare of 
land. At baseline, only 22% of households sold crops and only 13% purchased agricultural inputs 
                                                
5Households with total expenditures less than 93.37 kwacha per person per month in 2010 are considered to be 
severely poor. 
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(i.e., seeds, fertilizer, or pesticides). On average, households live 19 km from food markets, 
though there is considerable variation in the study sample.  
1.3. Results 
1.3.1. Cash transfers and weather shocks   
The first chapter of this dissertation situates cash transfers in the specific context of 
climate change in Africa and the severe risks it poses for development. Climate models predict 
dramatic disruptions to rainfall patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa, with disastrous consequences for 
agricultural yields and food security and a potential reversal of gains made in the region’s fight 
against poverty (IPCC, 2014). How the international community chooses to address climate 
mitigation and adaptation has significant implications for global inequality and intergenerational 
equity. While crop insurance and “ecosystem-based adaptation” are often cited as important 
climate adaptation strategies for rural Africa, little attention has been paid to the potential role of 
unconditional cash transfers. This study is the first to provide econometric evidence of how cash 
transfers could help households in rural Africa cope with extreme weather events affecting 
agricultural production.  
Between the first and second rounds of data collection for this study, 81% of the sample 
experienced droughts and floods as well as sharp fluctuations in food and crop prices. A common 
shock-coping strategy employed by poor, rural households is to simply reduce food 
consumption, given lack of savings, credit, or other options. Avoiding detrimental coping 
strategies that degrade households’ capabilities, and thus ability to escape poverty, is essential 
for building resilience to climate change. We find that in the face of shocks, cash empowers 
poor, rural households to employ coping strategies typically used by the non-poor, such as 
spending savings, and also enables them to substantially increase their food consumption and 
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overall food security. We also find some evidence that this positive impact of cash on shock-
coping is greatest when transfers are received prior to shock exposure, rather than ex-post. This 
evidence demonstrates that extending relatively small cash payments unconditionally and 
regularly to the rural poor is a powerful policy option for fostering climate-resilient development. 
1.3.2. Cash transfers, natural resource use, and market access 
The second chapter of this dissertation considers how cash transfers affect the 
environment and examines whether variation in market access is associated with heterogeneous 
impacts on natural resource use. The theoretical and empirical ambiguity characterizing poverty-
environment relationships motivates this study. Some suggest that reducing poverty could 
decrease rural households’ pressure on natural resources, while others argue poverty reduction 
increases such pressure by enhancing the poor’s ability to clear land and harvest resources. 
Recent literature, however, suggests this ambiguity may be clarified by more attention to market 
access when investigating poverty-environment relationships. This is because non-farm 
livelihood opportunities as well as resource quality and quantity likely vary depending on market 
access. For example, land resources may be less available and more degraded close to market 
centers due to the lower transaction costs of bringing agricultural and forest goods to market.  
This study is the first to examine the environmental impacts of a cash transfer program in 
Africa. We look at households’ use of fuelwood, charcoal, bushmeat, and land for farming as 
well as their ownership of non-farm businesses. Based on graphical analysis, we first find that 
impacts of the cash transfer on natural resources bifurcate around the distance of 10 km to 
market. We find that households living close to markets are more likely to use the cash transfer 
to start non-farm businesses as well as consume and/or produce charcoal. Households living far 
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from markets, on the other hand, are more likely to use cash transfers to enter farming or expand 
their already-existing farms.  
1.3.3. Cash transfers, bicycles, and market participation 
To date there has been little examination of how cash transfers’ effectiveness in remote 
rural areas may be hindered by supply-side constraints. That is, in areas far from markets 
dominated by subsistence farming, how will households be able to convert cash transfers into 
increased consumption and production? We consider this issue of market access and investigate 
whether bicycle ownership increases the effectiveness of the cash transfers. While there is little 
in the academic literature regarding the role of bikes in development, there is widespread belief 
amongst the numerous bicycle initiatives currently being implemented across Africa that bikes 
can increase poor households’ consumption, income, and use of social services (see, for 
example, the work of World Bicycle Relief, which has a large presence in Zambia).  
We examine impacts of the cash transfer as well as bicycle ownership on households’ 
participation in agricultural markets and ownership of non-farm businesses and test for both the 
independent and multiplicative effects of bikes and cash. While we do not find any evidence of 
multiplicative effects of bikes and cash (i.e., that impacts are greater for those with bikes 
amongst the cash transfer beneficiaries), we do find that bikes and cash, separately, have very 
distinct effects on livelihood strategies. While cash increases the likelihood of selling crops and 
purchasing agricultural inputs, it has no impact on the volume of crop sales or agricultural input 
purchases. Bicycle ownership, on the other hand, enables those households already selling crops 
to increase their crop sales over time and is also associated with an increase in the likelihood of 
purchasing agricultural inputs (equivalent to the effect size of cash). 
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1.3.4. Can cash transfers be transformative for household livelihoods? 
Taken together, these studies provide evidence that relatively small cash transfers can be 
transformative for rural African households in numerous ways. First, cash transfers offer a 
powerful, yet simple, approach for empowering the rural poor to manage the risks climate 
change poses to their well-being and livelihoods. Second, cash transfers enable households to 
increase their agricultural production. Households invest the cash grants in their farms and this 
effect is particularly strong amongst households living far from markets. Third, cash transfers 
facilitate households’ participation in markets. The income effects of cash transfers are powerful 
enough to shift livelihood strategies. Cash converts subsistence farmers into small-scale farmers 
that sell some of their production and purchase inputs. Cash also encourages entrepreneurial 
farmers, particularly those living close to markets, to diversify into non-farm enterprises.  
However, there are important nuances in these findings that offer lessons for programs 
targeting development in rural areas. Development impacts and trajectories will be greatly 
influenced by market access. And market access is determined not just by absolute distance, but 
by households’ ownership of key assets, such as bicycles, which facilitate market participation. 
For example, we find that while cash is more transformative than bikes in terms of converting 
subsistence farmers into small-scale sellers, bicycle ownership can empower households already 
engaged in agricultural markets to increase their crop sales over time – even in the context of 
declining crop revenues. This suggests bikes may be an important asset for maintaining growth 
trajectories in the context of repeated negative shocks that risk trapping households in poverty. 
The importance of market access in facilitating productive impacts of cash transfers also 
underscores the need for large-scale development initiatives to improve infrastructure. 
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Additionally, the impacts of cash transfers on natural resources will vary according to 
market distance and this heterogeneity has important implications for sustainable development. 
For example, our study suggests that, in this region, households receiving cash living close to 
markets will increase their consumption and/or production of charcoal (the number one driver of 
forest degradation in Zambia) and those living far from markets will enter farming or expand 
their existing farms. Can cash transfers truly be transformational for development in this context, 
given the potential for poverty-environment traps? These findings suggest areas for future 
research as well as the need to pair traditional sector interventions with cash transfer programs. 
For example, cash transfer programs in ex-urban areas could consider facilitating households’ 
adoption of alternative fuels through market mechanisms. In more remote areas, cash transfers 
could explore opportunities for expanding agricultural extension services to encourage land-
intensive practices as well as the safe handling of pesticides and fertilizers.   
In conclusion, these three studies provide evidence that unconditional cash transfers 
facilitate households’ autonomous adaptation and development decisions. For example, 
households may use cash transfers to expand their farms or to diversify into non-farm businesses, 
depending on their market distance and personal inclinations. Study households also use these 
transfers to positively cope with climate shocks that threaten food security. These responses 
indicate that cash transfers may be preferable to certain traditional development approaches on 
economic efficiency grounds. By allowing a diversity of livelihood approaches, cash transfers do 
not risk picking the wrong strategy or flooding markets with one good or service. And because 
unconditional cash transfers are congruent with both human rights frameworks recognizing the 
importance of agency as well as adaptation and development approaches emphasizing locally-
based solutions, there are strong normative arguments to be made for these transfers as well.  
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However, cash transfers are likely not an adequate replacement for many traditional 
development approaches. There are important supply-side constraints on rural households’ 
ability to convert cash transfers into consumption and production, which can only be tackled by 
large-scale initiatives to improve infrastructure. Bicycle initiatives can also help improve market 
access, but their efficaciousness in remote communities will likely be limited by absolute 
distance to market. Traditional development approaches that offer farmers information about 
safe, sustainable, and improved agricultural techniques as well as alternative cooking technology 
also have a role to play. Pairing demand-side approaches that increase household incomes via 
cash transfers and offer information regarding agriculture and other technologies with supply-
side approaches that facilitate market access could generate substantial welfare gains for rural 
communities. Future programming and research should explore these potential synergies 
between cash transfers and traditional development approaches.
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CHAPTER 2: 
 CASH TRANSFERS ENABLE HOUSEHOLDS TO COPE WITH WEATHER SHOCKS 
AND AVOID POVERTY TRAPS: EVIDENCE FROM ZAMBIA 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Climate change is projected to dramatically disrupt rainfall patterns and agricultural 
yields in Sub-Saharan Africa (IPCC, 2014). Given the large share of Africa’s population living in 
rural areas (World Bank, 2013(a)) and these communities’ dependence on rain-fed agriculture, 
climate change has the potential to stall and even reverse gains that have been made in the 
region’s fight against poverty (Shepherd et al., 2013). Frequent exposure to failed harvests and 
other negative income shocks is a reality of life for the world’s rural poor and many of these 
communities have developed strategies for coping with such shocks (Baez et al., 2013). 
However, some of these coping strategies can lead to poverty traps – the self-reinforcing 
conditions that cause poverty to persist. For example, coping with shocks by reducing food 
consumption, pulling children out of school, selling off productive assets, and adopting risk-
averse livelihood strategies that discourage growth can negatively affect human capital formation 
and prospects for escaping poverty in the long run (Dasgupta, 1997; Carter and Barrett, 2006; 
Wood, 2011). The likelihood of households employing coping strategies that can lead to poverty 
traps may be greater in the face of weather shocks, given their potential impact on food supplies 
and livelihoods. Additionally, weather shocks’ covariance across a community weakens informal 
safety nets, such as borrowing, further increasing household vulnerability (Skoufias, 2003; Baez 
et al., 2013; Boone et al., 2013). Avoiding detrimental coping strategies that degrade households’ 
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capabilities  (per Sen, 1999), and thus ability to escape poverty, is essential for building 
resilience to climate change (Barrett and Constas, 2014).  
This study investigates whether cash transfers enable households facing weather and 
other negative income shocks to avoid adverse coping strategies that can lead to poverty traps. 
To test this hypothesis, we harness data from the impact evaluation of Zambia’s Child Grant 
Program. The Child Grant Program is one of the Government of Zambia’s largest social 
protection programs. The program provides unconditional cash transfers of 60 kwacha (U.S. 
$12) per month to poor households with children under five years old. A randomized control trial 
was implemented with 2,515 households to investigate the impact of the program on a range of 
protective and productive outcomes between 2010 and 2012, with the baseline data collected just 
prior to program implementation. In addition to containing extensive information on both 
treatment and control households’ consumption, income, assets, and schooling decisions, the 
study also records the specific types of shocks experienced by respondents as well as their stated 
coping strategies.  
Weather shocks (droughts, floods, and storms) were the most commonly reported 
negative shock in both survey rounds. These weather shocks increased substantially between 
rounds, from 42% of the sample reporting such shocks in 2010 to 71% in 2012. Illness and 
changes in food prices were other commonly experienced shocks (22% and 35% in 2012, 
respectively), in addition to a multitude of other low-frequency shocks reported by households. 
Many households experienced multiple shocks and due to the increase in weather shocks over 
time, only 15% of households reported having completely avoided negative shocks in 2012. We 
investigate whether the cash transfer program fostered household resilience in the face of these 
myriad shocks and examine the impacts of cash on both stated and revealed (i.e., behavioral) 
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coping strategies. We also consider how the covariance of shocks across a community affects 
coping strategies.  
Given the preponderance of shocks these households experienced and the knock-on 
effects of weather shocks in agricultural economies, we first develop a new framework for 
classifying negative shocks. Because weather shocks can affect not only households’ production 
of agricultural goods for both home consumption and market sales, but also the price of these 
goods (due to increased scarcity or increased demand), we group together those shocks affecting 
agricultural production and prices. Next, we group together all other negative shocks affecting 
households’ assets, labor supply, and other sources of income. In addition to its basis in 
economic theory, this framework also has the nice property of separating those shocks more 
likely to be covariate and exogenous to the household (the agricultural production and price 
shocks) from those more likely to be idiosyncratic and the result of endogenous household 
choices (the asset, labor, and other income shocks). 
We find that amongst households facing agricultural production and price shocks, cash 
reduces the likelihood of reducing food consumption and increases the likelihood of employing 
more resilient coping strategies, such as spending savings. This analysis of stated coping 
strategies is supported by the behavioral data, which show that receiving cash enables 
households to smooth food consumption in the face of both covariate shocks affecting 
agricultural production and prices as well as other idiosyncratic shocks affecting households’ 
labor, assets, and income. We also find that amongst those households facing repeated shocks, 
the covariance of shocks across a community increases the likelihood of being food insecure – 
but the cash transfer still works to dramatically decrease food insecurity. 
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However, our analysis suggests that the timing of the transfer may matter. Our data allow 
us to disentangle the effects of cash on shock coping amongst those (1) shocked only at baseline, 
prior to program implementation; (2) shocked only after the program began; (3) repeatedly 
shocked; and (4) never shocked. The effect of cash on group (1) is akin to receiving cash as ex-
post disaster aid, while the effect of cash on group (2) [and somewhat group (3)] is akin to 
receiving cash ex-ante as part of a proactive, climate-resilient development program. We find 
that cash has strong, positive impacts on food security when the transfer is received prior to 
shock exposure, but some evidence that its impact may be weakened when received ex-post. But 
differential out-migration between treatment and control households experiencing weather 
shocks at baseline limits our ability to make strong causal statements regarding the timing of the 
cash transfer.  
Taken together, these results have significant implications for the design of climate 
change adaptation programs. While cash transfers are not routinely considered in the policy 
discourse concerning climate adaptation programming, because ex-ante transfers enable 
households to avoid negative coping strategies and even increase food consumption in the face of 
covariate weather shocks, cash transfers offer a sound approach for building climate-resilience 
amongst the world’s most vulnerable and facilitating their “autonomous adaptation” to a 
changing environment (as suggested by Wood, 2011). And because cash also enables households 
to productively cope with the many other idiosyncratic shocks the rural poor routinely face, cash 
transfers offer a “no-regrets” approach for climate adaptation programs.  
2.2. Poverty traps, shock coping, and cash transfers: Theory and evidence  
Evidence shows that the rich are likely to use savings, obtain credit, or work more in 
response to negative shocks, whereas the poor are more likely to sell off productive assets or 
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reduce consumption (World Bank, 2013(b)). On average, households tend to respond to negative 
income shocks by employing strategies that allow them to maintain their typical level of 
consumption (World Bank, 2013(b)). However, poor households often lack access to 
mechanisms such as insurance and credit that facilitate consumption smoothing – causing the 
poor to employ a different set of coping strategies than wealthier households (Morduch, 1995; 
Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; Carter et al., 2007; World Bank, 2013(b)). Moving children from 
school to the labor force is another coping strategy commonly employed by the poor (Beegle et 
al., 2004; de Janvry et al., 2006(a) and 2006(b)). The poor may also resort to increased 
harvesting of common-pool resources (e.g., firewood, bushmeat, etc.) to satisfy consumption and 
income needs in the face of shocks (Pattanayak and Sills, 2001).  
All of these coping strategies commonly used by the poor can weaken their potential for 
escaping poverty in this generation or the next by reducing household production, hindering the 
cognitive development of young children via malnutrition, limiting household members’ future 
schooling and work possibilities, or degrading the productivity of natural assets. This theory of 
‘poverty traps’ is articulated most eloquently by Dasgupta (1997) and supported by numerous 
studies analyzing long-run poverty dynamics (e.g., Glewwe et al., 2000; Carter et al., 2007; 
Hoddinott et al., 2008; and as summarized by Barrett et al., 2007 and World Bank 2013(b)). 
Classical theories of macroeconomic growth – unconditional and conditional 
convergence – are often applied at the microeconomic level for understanding household welfare 
trajectories (Carter and Barrett, 2006). These theories posit that all nations/individuals can grow 
economically along an exponential growth function. However, Barrett and Swallow (2005) and 
Carter and Barrett (2006) note that an economic growth function may include multiple dynamic 
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equilibria and argue that the concept of poverty traps therefore contradicts classical theories of 
economic growth. Figure 1 depicts their description of poverty trap dynamics.  
In the space of future well-being mapped onto current well-being, welfare dynamics 
create an S-shaped curve with three equilibrium points as shown. In this figure, WPL marks the 
poverty line. Those at the middle equilibrium point (WC) can easily be pushed down into the 
low-level (poor) equilibrium (WL) by negative income or asset shocks or easily pushed up to the 
high-level (non-poor) equilibrium (WH) by positive shocks. Once households find themselves at 
either the low- or high-level equilibrium they will tend to converge back to this point, despite 
small positive or negative income shocks that temporarily knock them off. Those at the low-level 
equilibrium are thus in a poverty trap; those that move above the middle equilibrium are moving 
along a self-propelled growth trajectory. This implies that those at the middle equilibrium are at a 
highly unstable point, which marks an important threshold.  
Cash transfer programs aim to help households escape poverty traps by providing cash 
that can be used to increase consumption of food, schooling, and health services, thereby 
increasing adults’ capacity for work and preventing the intergenerational transmission of poverty 
to children. Cash transfers should also foster resilience in the face of shocks and enable 
households to avoid coping strategies that lead to poverty traps (Blank et al., 2010) -- but the 
relationship between transfers and shock responses has gone relatively unexamined, despite 
numerous impact evaluations of cash transfer programs (Wood, 2011). Among the studies that 
have investigated this topic, the focus has been on households’ use of child labor as a shock 
response and impacts on schooling [see studies of cash transfer programs in Mexico by de Janvry 
et al. (2006(a)) and in Nicaragua by Gitter and Barham (2009) and Maluccio (2005)]. These 
studies also examine cases in Latin America, with evidence from African countries largely 
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missing. Given greater dependence on subsistence farming, weaker infrastructure and social 
services, and more severe poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, results from Latin America are likely 
not generalizable to the African context. 
More research is currently needed to identify interventions that can help poor households 
avoid coping strategies associated with poverty traps in the face of shocks. Following the theory 
and evidence it might seem the obvious answer is to make poor households non-poor via cash 
transfer programs. However, identifying the thresholds that define poverty traps remains a 
difficult task (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Dercon, 2007) and Carter and Barrett (2006) argue these 
thresholds may best be identified by measuring assets rather than consumption or income levels, 
which are the targets of cash transfer programs. This implies that cash transfers may not 
necessarily help households avoid poverty traps even if the transfer is predicted to push 
households above a consumption-based poverty line.  
The weather-related risks posed by climate change, which will disproportionately affect 
the poor in developing countries (IPCC, 2014), increase the importance of identifying 
interventions that can help households living in remote rural areas respond to negative shocks. 
2.3. Conceptual framework 
We examine whether receiving cash transfers effects households’ shock coping and 
consider the wide range of possible strategies suggested in the literature to be commonly used by 
the poor. Because we are primarily interested in the relationship between cash transfers and 
poverty traps, we distinguish between (1) coping strategies hypothesized in the literature to lead 
to poverty traps, including reducing food consumption, selling assets, sending children away or 
to work, and doing casual labor for others6; and (2) other coping strategies, many of which are 
                                                
6Casual labor for others (“piece work”) is often considered a negative coping strategy in this region. Boone et al. 
(2013) note that in Malawi such casual labor (“ganyu”) is often a coping strategy of last resort that can lead to 
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generally considered to be positive, such as starting a business, spending savings, and reducing 
non-food consumption. Borrowing from the valuation literature on stated and revealed 
preferences, we examine both households’ stated coping strategies as well as their revealed 
coping strategies (i.e., behavioral responses measured in the data). For the revealed coping 
strategies, we focus on food consumption, given the centrality of this outcome to avoiding 
poverty traps and building human capital. We use two measures of this outcome: per capita 
monthly food consumption and whether a household ranks as severely food insecure, based on 
their response to a series of questions commonly used to measure food security.7  
Following Dercon (2002), Carter and Maluccio (2003), Takasaki et al. (2004), and 
Debela et al. (2012), we distinguish between covariate and idiosyncratic shocks in our analysis, 
as the available strategy sets for dealing with each type of shock should differ, with covariate 
shocks posing greater risk of poverty trap coping (Skoufias, 2003). However, such a distinction 
is not necessarily easy to make. While, extreme weather events and price changes should be 
covariate shocks; and other negative shocks, such as job loss or illness tend to be idiosyncratic, 
this does not hold in all cases. For example, in the case of communicable disease, illness can 
affect a large portion of a community at once and where shocks are self-reported (as they are in 
our study), some might perceive a weather event as a negative shock while others take no notice 
of it.8 The literature reflects various strategies for distinguishing between covariate and 
idiosyncratic shocks: (1) use of the household-specific community mean (e.g., Debela et al., 
                                                                                                                                                       
poverty traps. This is because the labor on others’ farms is very low-wage and typically results in farmers delaying 
planting time on their own fields, which reduces yields. They argue farmers engage in such a sub-optimal allocation 
of off-farm labor because farmers in subsistence economies are severely cash-constrained. 
 
7Based on the FANTA food security scoring system. 
8This latter point of course highlights the potential for endogeneity bias with self-reported shock data. We discuss 
how our estimation strategy addresses potential endogeneity concerns in Section 2.5.2. 
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2012); (2) use of the general community mean (e.g., de Janvry et al., 2006(a)); or (3) establishing 
a (somewhat arbitrary) cutoff for what constitutes “covariate” (e.g., Carter and Maluccio, 2003).   
A second conceptual challenge for shock coping studies concerns how to identify the 
impact of a specific shock (such as a weather shock) when households experience multiple 
shocks at once (e.g., a weather shock, illness, and job loss in the same year). Some choose to 
only examine one type of shock (e.g., Beegle et al., 2006; Jack and Suri, 2014) or examine 
shocks separately (e.g., de Janvry et al., 2006), even though households might have experienced 
multiple shocks. How to classify and group together the numerous specific shocks households 
experience is another challenge, with no one framework consistently used in the literature. For 
example, Carter and Maluccio (2003) group together all reported shocks, including illness, job 
loss, crop failure, and theft, by converting them into monetary values of loss; while Debela et al. 
(2012) distinguish between labor and non-labor shocks. 
We employ the common strategy of using the household-specific community mean, 
which is the percent of the sample community that experienced a shock, exclusive of the 
household. This community mean measure is useful for investigating how a marginal increase in 
shock covariance across a community affects shock coping. But because we are particularly 
interested in weather shock coping, we also develop a new framework for categorizing shocks 
that allows us to distinguish the weather-related (and generally more covariate and plausibly 
exogenous) shocks from the non-weather (and generally more idiosyncratic, possibly 
endogenous) shocks. Agricultural households in rural developing economies tend to be both 
sellers and consumers of their own production. Weather shocks can therefore impact not only 
households’ production of agricultural goods for both home consumption and market sales, but 
also the price of agricultural goods that might be purchased or sold by affecting their supply and 
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demand. Additionally, weather shocks can increase crops’ susceptibility to disease and pests, as 
well as damage crop storage facilities. For these reasons, we group together all shocks affecting 
agricultural production and prices. We then group together all other negative shocks affecting 
households’ assets, labor supply, and non-farm income. And because our unique dataset contains 
households’ account of how they coped with each specific shock, we can use this information to 
investigate the differences between how households cope with the largely covariate agricultural 
production and price shocks versus the more idiosyncratic asset, labor, and other non-farm 
income shocks. 
We also compare the impacts two policy design options: (1) extension of the cash transfer 
prior to experiencing a negative income shock and (2) extension of the transfer in the wake of the 
shock. This allows us to estimate the difference between what an ex-post disaster aid cash 
transfer program might be able to accomplish with one that is focused on building households’ 
climate resilience ex-ante. 
2.4. Data and descriptive statistics 
There were 221 households that migrated out of the study area after the collection of 
baseline data (see Table 1). Handa et al. (2014) examine the effect this attrition had on the 
sample and find no differential attrition between the control and treatment groups in terms of 
rates or their observable household characteristics. These authors also investigate whether out-
migration led to overall attrition bias (i.e., whether those that remain in the sample are, on 
average, different from the overall baseline sample). They find that the sample stays generally 
the same over time, in terms of observable household characteristics, with the principal 
difference being that those who remained in the sample were less likely to experience a weather 
shock at baseline. This follows from the observation that 72% of the households that left the 
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study lived in Kaputa district at baseline, where a lake important for fishing and farming 
livelihoods is drying up, causing mass migration out of the area. While this out-migration due to 
weather shocks does not bias our results, it does have implications for external validity.  
There was a sharp increase in the percent of households experiencing negative weather 
shocks (droughts, floods, or storms) between the survey waves – from 42% in 2010 to 71% in 
2012 (Table 2). When the shocks to crop production and prices, which are likely knock-on 
effects of the weather shocks, are factored in, a total of 81% of the sample experienced 
agricultural production and price shocks in 2012. Shocks to households’ assets, labor, and non-
farm income show much lower frequency in the sample (experienced by 36% of the sample in 
2012) and their prevalence did not increase as sharply over time. Drought (47%), food price 
change (35%), floods (30%), illness (22%), livestock disease (11%), and crop disease/pests 
(11%) were the most commonly reported shocks (see Table 3).9  
We investigate the covariance of each specific shock within communities by calculating 
the percent of the sample that experienced the shock for each community. Table 4 shows the 
average of these percentages for each shock. The average covariance levels for communities do 
not differ much from the averages for the overall sample (Table 3) and indicate that the 
agricultural production and price shocks are indeed much more covariate than the asset, labor, 
and other income shocks.  
Households employed a wide range of coping strategies for dealing with these shocks. 
We asked households about their primary as well as secondary coping strategy for each shock 
they reported. We combine the primary and secondary strategies to compute the tallies in Table 
5. All of the principal coping strategies identified in the literature as leading to poverty traps are 
                                                
9In the survey households were asked about 21 specific shocks. If they said they experienced the shock, they were 
then asked whether the effect was positive or negative. We limit our analysis to those shocks reported by households 
to have a negative effect.    
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represented in our dataset. We also classify “doing nothing” as a poverty trap coping strategy 
based on empirical analysis of household characteristics at baseline, which shows that 
households who “did nothing” in the wake of a shock had significantly lower food consumption 
than those who reported a different coping strategy, although they were similar along all other 
observable characteristics. Reducing food consumption (including “doing nothing”) and doing 
piece work for others are the dominant poverty trap coping strategies in our dataset.         
2.5. Estimation strategy 
2.5.1. Testing assumptions of the impact estimates’ econometric models 
Due to random assignment of the program, treatment status should not be correlated with 
observed or unobserved characteristics of participating households or communities. We confirm 
whether randomization yielded similar observable characteristics between treatment and control 
households by testing for their equivalence at baseline. We test for equivalence at baseline in 
terms of basic characteristics of the recipient/respondent and household, self-reported shocks, 
and our key outcomes of interest (stated and revealed coping strategies) and report these results 
in Tables 6 and 7. We restrict our analysis to just the panel of households that remained in the 
survey for both rounds and cluster robust standard errors at the community-level (and do so for 
all subsequent models). We examine equivalence at baseline for all variations of the sample used 
in subsequent impact estimates: the full panel as well as the four shock sub-groups.  
For the full panel, we find that randomization succeeded in producing balanced treatment 
and control groups. We find no significant differences between treatment and control households 
along observable characteristics, general shock exposure, and our key outcomes of interest – per 
capita food consumption and overall food security. Households in treatment communities, 
 28 
however, were 7 percentage points less likely to report an agricultural production or price shock 
at baseline (see Table 7). 
We also find some interesting differences between control and treatment households at 
baseline in terms of stated coping strategies (Table 7). Prior to receiving cash, households in 
treatment communities were more likely to increase household production or reduce non-food 
expenses in the wake of agricultural production and price shocks than those residing in control 
communities. In the face of asset, labor, and other negative income shocks, treatment households 
were more likely to do piece work for others or participate in a work program and less likely to 
obtain loans/gifts or “do nothing”. These differences in stated shock coping strategies at baseline 
need to be considered when examining our impact estimates, and draw our focus to examination 
of just those stated coping strategies balanced at baseline.  
Our analysis of revealed coping strategies (food consumption and food security score) 
breaks the full panel down into four shock sub-groups, based on the temporal trends of shock 
experience. We therefore test for equivalence at baseline for these four sub-groups as well and 
find that they are generally balanced in terms of observable characteristics and our key outcomes 
of interest. This equivalence at baseline allows us to attribute any estimated differences in 
revealed coping strategies to the cash transfer program. However, for those shocked at round 1 
only, the control group has significantly lower per capita food consumption. This suggests that in 
response to shocks amongst households in the control group, it was the better off households 
who migrated out of the area and the poorer households who stayed. This lack of equivalence at 
baseline prevents us from examining the impact of cash on food consumption amongst those 
shocked only at baseline. 
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Next, we examine whether treatment and control households are experiencing the same 
time trend with respect to shock exposure. The time trend could be different due to either (1) 
differential weather patterns between treatment and control communities over time or (2) actual 
impacts of cash on the likelihood of experiencing or perceiving a shock (i.e., cash might reduce 
the likelihood of falling ill by improving nutrition or it might cause one to not notice a change in 
prices that other perceive as significant). To test for differential time trends, we run a difference-
in-difference model, specified in Equation (1) as follows:  
(1) Yigt = B0 + B1Postigt + B2Cashig + B3(Postigt*Cashig) + B4Xig + B5 Zg + Wg +Eigt  
where Yigt measures whether a shock was reported by household i in district g in period t, Postigt 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is in 2012, Cashig is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the household is in the treatment group, Xig represents a vector of household and recipient 
characteristics measured at baseline, Zg, is a vector of baseline prices for food and other 
important consumption goods, Wg is a district fixed effect, and Eigt is the error term. We include 
controls for baseline characteristics and prices and district fixed effects to increase the precision 
of our estimates. The coefficient of interest in this model is B3, which captures the effect of being 
in a treatment community on self-reported shocks.  
The interaction variable (Cash*Post) representing the effect of cash on self-reported 
negative shocks is not significant for any of the three models presented in Table 8. Control and 
treatment households therefore appear to be experiencing the same time trends with respect to 
shock exposure.  
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2.5.2. Identification strategy for impact estimates 
To understand the impact of cash on households’ stated coping strategies, we run a series of first 
difference models using the 2012 survey data and restricted to those who reported a negative 
shock. This model can be written as: 
(2) Yigt = B0 + B1Cashig + B2Xig + B3Zg + Wg +Eigt  |  Shock2012=1 
where all terms are defined as they were in Equation (1), but now Yigt is a dummy variable coded 
as 1 if a household reported using the specific coping strategy in question. The identifying 
assumption for this model is that both the treatment and control groups would have had, on 
average, similar, shock coping strategies in 2012, had the treatment group not received cash. 
However, our equivalence at baseline tests shows that this assumption does not hold for certain 
shock coping strategies. Therefore, we focus our discussion of results on those stated coping 
strategies balanced at baseline.  
To further probe household coping strategies, we use both rounds of data and examine 
whether cash may have affected households’ food consumption and overall food security score. 
Like Equation (2), these models are conditional on households’ shock experience. We run four 
sets of models, as specified below: 
(3) Yigt = B0 + B1Postigt + B2Cashig + B3(Postigt*Cashig) + B4Xig + B5Zg +  
         Wgt +(eigt + µit + vi)  |  Shock2010=1 & Shock 2012=1 
 
(4) Yigt = B0 + B1Postigt + B2Cashig + B3(Postigt*Cashig) + B4Xig + B5Zg +  
         Wgt +(eigt + µit + vi)  | Shock2010=0 & Shock 2012=0 
 
(5) Yigt = B0 + B1Postigt + B2Cashig + B3(Postigt*Cashig) + B4Xig + B5Zg +  
         Wgt +(eigt + µit + vi)  |  Shock2010=1 & Shock 2012=0 
 
(6) Yigt = B0 + B1Postigt + B2Cashig + B3(Postigt*Cashig) + B4Xig + B5Zg +  
         Wgt +(eigt + µit + vi)  |  Shock2010=0 & Shock 2012=1 
 
{Shocked both rounds} 
{Never shocked} 
{Shocked round 1 only} 
{Shocked round 2 only} 
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where terms reflect their definitions as described for Equations (1) and (2), though here Yigt is, 
depending upon the series of models, monthly per capita food consumption or a dummy variable 
coded as 1 if the household ranks as severely food insecure. For the purposes of transparency, we 
also decompose the error term here into its various components, with eigt  representing truly 
random error and µit representing unobserved household characteristics that vary over time and vi 
those that are time-invariant. Time-invariant characteristics at the level of the treatment group 
(i.e., on average) are removed in the differencing. And while, econometrically, unobserved time-
varying characteristics at the level of the treatment group remain in the error (as well as µit and 
vi), the randomized research design provides strong assurance that there are no systematic 
differences between the treatment and control groups along either observed or unobserved 
characteristics. Therefore, there is little reason to believe that our estimates reported in Tables 11 
and 12 are biased by unobserved heterogeneity.  
An alternative estimation strategy would be to run triple difference models on the full 
sample (where Cash is interacted with both Shock and Post) with household fixed effects (to 
control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics) to identify the effect of both receiving 
Cash and being shocked on food security. Jack and Suri (2014) take such an approach in their 
analysis of how Kenya’s mobile money system enables households to cope with illness shocks. 
However, the challenge with these models is that they use only those who switch shock status 
between rounds to estimate the parameters of interest (i.e., treatment effects). In our dataset, such 
an analytical approach does not make sense given that many experienced shocks both rounds and 
amongst those that changed status over time, some went from no shock in 2010 to a shock in 
2012, while others experienced the opposite time trend – so any effects of cash would be 
confounded by these two sub-populations’ experiences. From an econometric standpoint, given 
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the shock frequencies in our data and our randomized research design, we believe our sets of 
difference-in-difference models are more appropriate (and more transparent). Moreover, by 
disaggregating the analysis according to the temporal experience of shocks, we are able to have a 
higher degree of external validity and answer an important policy design question: Does it matter 
whether cash is extended before or after a household experiences a negative shock?  
2.6. Results 
We find that cash reduces the likelihood of employing negative coping strategies 
associated with poverty traps and increases the likelihood of employing positive coping 
strategies. Tables 9 and 10 present the impacts of cash on stated coping. We run two sets of 
models for each coping strategy: The first restricted to those who experienced agricultural 
production or price shocks in 2012; the second restricted to those who experienced an asset, 
labor, or other negative income shock in 2012. We find that amongst those that experienced an 
agricultural production or price shock, cash reduces the likelihood of reducing food consumption 
(“doing nothing”) by 14 percentage points and increases the likelihood of spending savings by 6 
percentage points. Cash also increases the likelihood of using social services (visiting the clinic 
or seeking help from the government or an NGO) by 2 percentage points in the case of 
agriculture and price shocks and by 12 percentage points for other shocks. Importantly, all of 
these stated coping strategies were balanced at baseline, implying that we can confidently 
attribute the observed differences reported here to the cash transfer program. 
These impacts of cash on stated coping strategies are supported by our analysis of the 
behavioral data, which shows that the program has positive impacts on food consumption and 
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overall food security (Tables 11 and 12).10 We find that cash increases monthly per capita food 
expenditures by 31% for those never shocked, by 35% for those shocked only after program 
implementation (round 2), and by 29% for those shocked both prior to and during the program. 
[Because food consumption amongst those shocked only prior to the start of the program (round 
1) was not balanced at baseline, we can not estimate the impact of cash for this sub-group.]. We 
see a similar trend with the food security scores. Cash decreases the probability of being severely 
food insecure by 24 percentage points amongst those never shocked, by 25 percentage points 
amongst those shocked round 2 only, and by 25 percentage points amongst those shocked both 
rounds. For those shocked at round 1 only, we do not find evidence that cash has any effect on 
food security. 
We then add a variable measuring shock prevalence in each of the 90 sample 
communities to our difference-in-difference models to understand the effect of shock covariance 
on the impact of cash (see Tables 13 and 14). This variable is the percent in each community 
sample reporting a shock, exclusive of the household. When this variable is added to the 
difference-in-difference models, the effects of cash on food consumption and food security 
remain relatively unchanged from the original estimates presented in Tables 11 and 12 – even 
though a one percentage point increase in community shock prevalence increases the likelihood 
of being food insecure by 14 percentage points for those shocked both rounds. For these two 
shock groups we also see that a one percentage point increase in community shock prevalence 
increases their food consumption by 30 and 33 percent, respectively. This suggests that the 
                                                
10For these difference-in-difference models, we group together agricultural production and price shocks with asset, 
labor, and other income shocks, since many households experienced both types of shocks and it is not possible to 
disentangle their effects in the revealed data measuring food consumption and food security.  
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mechanism by which cash increases food security in the face of covariate shocks is by enabling 
households to increase food production and/or purchases. 
2.7. Conclusions and policy implications 
We find that cash transfers enable households to cope with negative shocks in ways that 
do not increase the likelihood of falling into a poverty trap. Cash empowers the poor, rural 
households in our study to employ shock-coping strategies commonly used by the non-poor, 
such as spending savings. The cash transfers provided by Zambia’s Child Grant Program are able 
to increase both food consumption and food security even while the covariance of shocks within 
a community increases the likelihood of being severely food insecure.  
The most recent report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that  
“Throughout the 21st century, climate-change impacts are projected to slow down 
economic growth, make poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security, and 
prolong existing and create new poverty traps (p. 20) …”                                                                            
 
Our study provides evidence of a program -- unconditional cash transfers – that can work to help 
households avoid the poverty traps that climate change threatens to create and entrench. 
Moreover, we show that a specific program design feature – extending cash to households before 
severe shocks to agricultural production and prices occur – achieves strong, positive impacts on 
food consumption and food security.  
 The international community concerned with climate change has become increasingly 
focused on developing adaptation strategies in recent years. Crop insurance (Barrett et al., 2007; 
Baez et al., 2013) and “ecosystem-based adaptation” (FAO and UNEP, 2013) are two potential 
adaptation strategies that have received a great deal of attention -- and for Africa in particular. 
However, the concept of using ex-ante cash transfer programs (i.e., as opposed to ex-post cash or 
in-kind disaster relief) as an adaptation strategy for rural Africa has received little attention. This 
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may be due to limited interaction between the environmental policy community and the social 
protection community. There is clearly a need to link these two policy communities and their 
attendant literatures. 
While Wood (2011) argues that cash transfers should be given a greater role in climate 
adaptation and the recent World Development Report (World Bank, 2013(b)) also highlights the 
value of cash transfers for risk management and shock-coping in the context of climate change, 
to date there have been no published evaluations of cash transfer programs that focus on climate 
and adaptation questions.11 This study therefore fills an important gap in the literature and offers 
policy-relevant evidence that should inform the design of climate adaptation programs.  
One advantage cash transfers offer over other potential adaptation interventions is their 
unique ability to address the context of climate change, which is characterized by “deep 
uncertainty.” In their discussion of the economics of risk and uncertainty in the 2014 World 
Development Report, The World Bank describes problems of deep uncertainty as those where 
“…experts cannot agree on which models to use…; on the probability distributions of key 
uncertain parameters…; or on the values of alternative outcomes” (2013(b), p. 93). Climate 
change is one such problem, because while models converge on predictions of disrupted rainfall 
patterns in Africa, at the local level models diverge – some predict decreases in rainfall and 
droughts, others predict increased rainfall and floods. Given that cash transfers have already been 
demonstrated by numerous studies (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009) to reduce both short-term 
poverty and its long-term determinants, they therefore offer a “no regrets” (Woods, 2011) 
strategy for climate-resilient development policy. Further, as also argued by Woods (2011) cash 
                                                
11Asfaw et al. (2011), however, report they are currently studying the impact of Lesotho’s cash transfer program on 
farmers’ adaptation strategies, with a particular focus on changes in a series of specific farming practices. The 2014 
World Development Report also reports advance results from evaluations of how cash transfer programs in Ethiopia 
and El Salvador have helped households cope with droughts and natural disasters (World Bank, 2013(b), p. 104-
105). 
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transfers facilitate individuals’ autonomous adaptation and development decisions, making them 
both congruent with a human rights framework that recognizes the importance of agency as well 
as adaptation frameworks that embrace locally-based and diverse solutions.
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CHAPTER 3: 
 POVERTY-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONSHIPS UNDER MARKET 
HETEROGENEITY: CASH TRANSFERS AND PRODUCER-CONSUMERS IN 
ZAMBIA 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Poverty alleviation programs in developing countries are typically not concerned with 
their environmental impacts. Conservation programs in these settings, however, often seek to 
achieve ‘wins-wins’ for environment and development, believing these twin goals to be 
inextricably linked (Wunder, 2001; Angelsen and Atmadja, 2008). Yet poverty-environment 
relationships in remote rural areas are complex and theoretically ambiguous (Reardon and Vosti, 
1995; Scherr, 2000; Wunder, 2001). For example, numerous studies indicate that the poor often 
cope with income and consumption shocks by increasing their use of natural resources (e.g., 
Pattanayak and Sills, 2001; Takasaki et al., 2004; McSweeney, 2005; Debela et al., 2012) and 
there is some limited evidence that positive income shocks can reduce such reliance (Fisher and 
Shively, 2005). But reducing poverty may not benefit biodiversity conservation in all cases – it 
likely depends on whether environmental products, such as wild foods, are inferior or normal 
goods in particular communities. Similarly, impacts on land use may also be variable: reducing 
poverty may increase households’ ability to expand their farms -- thereby increasing pressure on 
ecosystems -- or it may expand households’ ability to participate in markets for off-farm labor, 
decreasing such pressure. 
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Poverty-environment relationships should also differ depending on whether one takes a 
short-run or long-run view, though the directional change over time is not clear. On the one 
hand, Environmental Kuznets Curve theory posits that societies exploit natural resources to 
escape poverty and at a certain inflection point of wealth then begin demanding environmental 
amenities that flow from conserved resources (Koop and Tole, 1999). On the other hand, the 
environmental impacts of reducing poverty can have important feedback effects for poverty 
itself: Barbier (2010) argues that the drive to raise incomes through agriculture and resource 
exploitation can lead to ‘poverty-environment traps’ if markets for land, off-farm labor, and 
credit are incomplete. And if reducing poverty increases consumption of wild game, over-
exploitation can lead to the collapse of populations that may be an important source of protein 
for the (future) rural poor.  
This theoretical ambiguity may be clarified by more nuanced consideration of 
heterogeneous access to markets when examining poverty-environment relationships. Research 
by Ferraro et al. (2011) has shown that the ability of conservation programs to achieve poverty 
and environment ‘win-wins’ is moderated by market access, though Alix-Garcia et al. (2013) 
also note that we are of course only able to observe the full environmental impacts of human 
behavior where poor transportation networks effectively localize them.     
This study explores these themes by examining the short-run impacts of a poverty 
alleviation program that extends unconditional cash transfers to households in rural Zambia. We 
investigate impacts on households’ consumption of fuelwood, charcoal, and bushmeat, as well as 
their use of land for farming. We also examine an element of the causal chain hypothesized by 
Barbier (2010) to be important for avoiding poverty-environment traps: program impacts on off-
farm business enterprises. Particular attention is paid to investigating whether impacts vary 
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according to market access. We hypothesize that distance to market significantly affects 
household decision-making regarding conversion of the transfer into consumption and 
production.  
3.2. Cash transfers, transaction costs, and impact heterogeneity: Theory and evidence  
Agricultural households in subsistence economies clearly live in a world characterized by 
multiple market imperfections. Lack of cash and opportunities for wage labor and loans create 
liquidity and credit constraints, limiting purchase of productive agricultural inputs. High 
transaction costs associated with selling crops also hinders specialization and commercial 
activity -- as does the high uncertainty regarding the purchase price of food, which further 
encourages self-sufficiency in food production rather than commercial agriculture. All of these 
points and the importance of considering non-separability when examining cash transfer 
programs in rural areas have been raised by Handa et al. (2010) and Boone et al. (2013).  
But the focus thus far has been on considering agricultural households’ shadow value of 
time (e.g., Handa et al. (2010)) and how cash transfers can help increase agricultural production 
by relaxing farmers’ liquidity and credit constraints (e.g., Boone et al., 2013). 
And while the concepts of non-separability and price bands created by transaction costs 
are generally accepted in the literature, examination of how variable transaction costs moderate 
households’ production and consumption decisions is not routine. And yet, as Lofgren and 
Robinson (1999) note: 
“The existence of such non-separability indicates the presence of market imperfections or 
failures that may have important policy implications. For example, depending on the 
nature of the market imperfections, there may be “threshold” effects whereby policy 
changes have no effect on household behavior until the change is “large” in some 
measure. In this environment, policy analysis assuming the existence of perfect markets 
may badly misstate the impact of policy changes on producer behavior and household 
welfare” (p. 1). 
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de Janvry and Sadoulet (2003) also call for more examination of how transaction costs affect 
rural household behavior. Consideration of how distance to markets affects households’ 
production decisions is receiving increasing attention in the conservation planning and 
evaluation literature (e.g., Ferraro et al., 2011; Joppa and Pfaff, 2009), but attention to this topic 
has received comparatively less attention in the development economics and cash transfer 
literatures. One exception is a study by Alix-Garcia et al. (2013), which examines the ecological 
impacts of Mexico’s Oportunidades program. 
In addition to commenting on the importance of understanding market linkages when 
implementing poverty alleviation programs in rural areas, this study aims to contribute evidence 
on the heterogeneous impacts of cash transfer programs. Few studies have explored impact 
heterogeneity in the context of cash transfers and those that do focus on cases from Latin 
America and health and schooling outcomes. For example, Handa et al. (2010) test for 
heterogeneous impacts of Progresa in Mexico and whether use of schooling and health services 
differs between agricultural and non-agricultural households. Dammert (2009) examines 
heterogeneous impacts of Nicaragua’s Red de Proteccion Social program and finds that impacts 
on schooling and child labor differ according to the age and gender of the child, gender of the 
household head, and degree of poverty in the community. Galiani and McEwan (2013) look at 
variation in impacts of the Honduran Programa de Asignacion Familiar (PRAF) and find that the 
program’s positive impacts on children’s schooling and labor activity are much larger for the 
poorest of the poor.  
 In order to improve the design and success of public policies we often need to understand 
more than just their average impacts and compare impacts for different sub-populations. For 
example, if the impacts of cash transfers’ are more muted in remote communities, then 
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policymakers should consider how to simultaneously address both supply-side and demand-side 
factors driving poverty (or perhaps just focus on supply-side factors). As noted by Handa and 
Davis (2006), cash transfers implicitly assume that the poor consume less schooling and health 
services due to constraints on their demand – and not that issues of access and quality might pose 
constraints on the supply-side. Similarly, in remote rural areas, supply-side factors may also 
constrain basic consumption of food and non-food items as well as agricultural production. 
Rawlings and Rubio (2005) and Handa and Davis (2006) argue that uncovering heterogeneous 
impacts and any supply-side constraints are some of the most pressing questions facing the next 
phase of cash transfer research.  
The salience of the question is also reflected in the findings of a recent evaluation by 
Chetty et al. (2013) of one of the United State’s flagship anti-poverty programs (which is 
essentially a cash transfer program) – the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). While the study 
provides correlational evidence that the EITC has helped children move out of poverty, it also 
finds that much of the variation in a child’s prospects for escaping poverty is explained by 
community-level variables such as rates of segregation, marriage, religiosity, and inequality. 
Accompanying qualitative reports hint at the role transactions costs associated with paid work 
may play as well (see Leonhardt, 2013).  
3.3. Conceptual Framework 
Following Singh et al. (1986), Sills et al. (2003), and Barbier (2010), we use household 
production theory to present a model adapted to the specific characteristics of the agricultural 
household in rural developing economies. In such models, time is the primary input to 
production and the household consumes most of their own production. From this household 
production framework we derive equations for estimating household consumption and 
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production. We assume households maximize Utility, which depends on consumption of three 
goods: those purchased in the market (X), those produced at home (H), and leisure (L). 
Households consume these goods, conditioned on their preferences ( ), subject to four 
constraints: an agricultural and environmental goods production function (the technological 
constraint), the time constraint, an earned income constraint, and a cash constraint.  
The objective function and constraints are defined as follows: 
Max U(X, H, L; ) 
A = f(TA, XA; FA)    [Tech Constraint] 
T = L + TA + TM      [Time Constraint] 
E = w*TM              [Earned Income Constraint] 
Px*X + PxA*XA  pA(A-H) + w*TM + C     [Cash Constraint] 
Own production of agricultural and environmental goods (A) is a function of time inputs 
(TA), purchased inputs (XA), and the quality of natural resources, including plot fertility (FA), 
which is exogenously fixed. Time (T) is composed of leisure time, time in production of 
agricultural and environmental goods (TA), and time spent in the market on wage labor (TM). 
Earned income (E) is the multiple of any market time and the wage (w). The cash constraint 
dictates that expenditures on market goods and agricultural inputs must be less than or equal to 
the sum of the marketed surplus from home production [pA(A-H)], earned income, and 
exogenous sources of income (C), such as the cash transfer. 
The time, earned income, and cash constraints can be combined into a full income 
constraint such that the Lagrangian can be written as: 
 = U(X,H,L; ) + 1[f(TA, XA; FA)] + 2[wT + C + pA(A-H) – (pXX + pXAXA + wL + wTA)]  
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The choice variables are consumption of market goods (X), consumption of own produced goods 
(H), leisure time (L), time in own production (TA), time in market TM, own production (A), and 
agricultural inputs (XA).  
Solving this constrained optimization problem yields first order conditions that reveal 
households equate marginal costs with marginal benefits when making consumption and 
production decisions. The shadow values measuring how binding the technological ( 1) and full 
income constraints ( 2) are play key roles in the household’s choice of optimal bundles. These 
shadow values are specific to each household and, like the six choice variables identified in the 
Lagrangian, are thus endogenous and a function of all exogenous variables in the system.  
Where the shadow price for a consumption-production good (functions of the constraint’s 
shadow value and the good’s marginal utility) equals the market price for the good, household 
decisions can be viewed as separable (Lofgren and Robinson, 1999). The household first 
maximizes producer profits and then maximizes their consumption utility according to this 
income. In such cases markets can be viewed as complete and prices and income are key 
determinants of household production and consumption in line with standard theory (Sills et al., 
2003). But where the shadow and market prices differ, household production and consumption 
decisions are said to be non-separable. As Lofgren and Robinson (1999) state, this non-
separability exists “…whenever the household shadow price of at least one producer-consumer 
good is not given exogenously by the market but instead is determined endogenously by the 
interaction between household demand and supply” (p.2).  
Non-separability arises whenever markets are incomplete (Sills et al., 2003). Lofgren and 
Robinson (1999) note that farm households in developing economies typically face these market 
imperfections due to the following circumstances: (1) the market purchased good is not a perfect 
€ 
λ
€ 
λ
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substitute for the home produced good, (2) the household is not a price-taker, and (3) there are 
gaps between the sales price and purchase price of a good. Sills et al. (2003) describe how these 
“price bands” for goods are caused by variable transaction costs facing households, which are 
influenced both by exogenous sources of market integration (e.g., distance) and endogenous 
sources, such as connections to traders. These variable transaction costs imply that markets for 
consumption and production goods may be complete for some but incomplete for others. These 
insights motivate our adoption of a conceptual framework that explicitly tests how constraints on 
household’s market participation affect their consumption and production decisions.12 
3.4. Data and descriptive statistics 
In-depth information was collected from households’ regarding their use of natural 
resources and establishment of non-farm business enterprises. In the case of fuel and food, we 
asked households the amounts of resources consumed within the previous four weeks (charcoal 
and fuelwood) or two weeks (bushmeat); specifically, the amounts purchased at market, received 
as gifts, and produced/collected themselves. Households reported the price of these amounts (or 
what the price would have been had it been purchased) and we aggregate these values into one 
consumption value (expressed in kwacha) for each resource. Additionally, households were 
surveyed about their agricultural production in the previous season (between October 2011 and 
September 2012), including the area of land used. In 2012, households also reported whether 
they owned a non-farm business.  
Households in the sample are quite poor, with 92% living below the poverty line and 
90% severely food insecure (Table 15). On average, households live between 16 and 22 km from 
a market. At baseline, roughly 90% of households consumed fuelwood, 5% charcoal, and only 
                                                
12The conceptual model could suggest that there is also a “transaction costs/market participation constraint” that is a 
function of distance, road quality, etc. as well as endogenous market regime. 
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2% bushmeat. Households with bushmeat consumption tend to have higher food consumption 
and be less food insecure than the panel average. We also see that both charcoal and bushmeat 
consumers are more likely to live in Kaputa. Bushmeat consumption is driven by purchases 
(87%) whereas fuelwood and charcoal consumption are driven by household’s own production 
(98% and 73%, respectively). 
To investigate whether there are heterogeneous impacts of the cash transfer due to a 
household’s distance to market, we split the full panel into two sub-samples using 10 km as a 
cutoff point. We first explored the data graphically using Lowess-smoothed plots to see if there 
appear to be differential effects of cash that vary according to market distance (see Figures 2-
11).13 These graphs clearly show that, for the treatment group, impacts bifurcate around the 
10km mark for all of our outcomes of interest. Intuitively, the 10km point makes sense when one 
considers that humans walk, on average, 5 km an hour, and so a one day round-trip to a market 
more than 10 km away implies more than 4 hours of walking in one day. Households farther 
from markets may make different consumption and production decisions because they have less 
access to markets goods; their economic behavior may also differ because the quantity (e.g., 
fuelwood, bushmeat) or quality (e.g., soil fertility) of natural resources may be greater farther 
from markets.  
Because the graphs show a clear bifurcation around the 10km mark, this indicates that 
there are threshold effects, which may not be picked up by measuring the effect of distance in a 
pooled (no market split) triple-difference model using a continuous measure of distance. 
Additionally, if the effects of market distance and cash are working in opposite directions, trying 
                                                
13We plot Lowess-smoothed graphs to explore whether there are differential impacts of cash that vary according to 
market distance. To create these graphs we first run triple-difference regressions (and difference-in-difference in the 
case of non-farm businesses) that interact market distance (logged) with cash, time, and both cash and time. We then 
plot the predicted results of these regressions for households in 2012. We restrict these graphs to those living within 
20 km or less of markets (74% of households). 
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to capture the interactive effects of cash and distance in a triple-difference model using a binary 
measure of distance could also miss important threshold effects. For these reasons, we use the 10 
km cutoff to split the sample into two sub-groups. 
The 10km cutoff splits the sample into 1201 households living more than 10km from a 
market and 1097 living within 10km from a market. For those living far from markets, average 
distances range from 20 to 39 km across the natural resource/control-treatment sub-groups. For 
the sub-groups living close to markets, average distances range from only 2-4 km. Comparing 
the two market distance sub-samples, we see that the recipient and demographic characteristics 
tend to be similar. However, somewhat surprisingly, households living closer to markets tend to 
be poorer, with higher food insecurity and lower food consumption – though they have higher 
wealth scores (i.e., more assets). 
The vast majority of households in the sample – 89% – farmed land in 2012 (Table 18). 
[We lack baseline data on agricultural production and non-farm businesses and therefore report 
descriptive statistics for the 2012 data.] Maize, cassava, and rice are the most common crops in 
the sample, followed by millet, groundpeas, and sorghum. These small-holders farmed, on 
average, less than one hectare (ha) each. The largest plots measure between 10 and 12 hectares.  
Households were asked to name up to three non-farm businesses that they own (Table 
19). Of the 885 households (39% of the sample) that own a non-farm business, 73 (8%) own 
more than one business. We examine whether or not these businesses are based on exploitation 
of natural resources, which in this sample includes fishing, charcoal production, and haying. 
Thirteen percent of households own a business based on natural resources, 27% own other types 
of businesses. The most important non-farm businesses represented in the sample are fishing 
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(12% of households), home brewery (10%), and petty trader (6%). Only 2% of households 
produce and sell charcoal.    
3.5. Estimation strategy 
Because non-separable models of household consumption and production decisions are 
functions of exogenous household preferences and characteristics they can be estimated using a 
reduced form approach (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2003). To estimate the impacts of cash on 
natural resource use we run a series of difference-in-difference models, which compare the 
temporal change in the treatment group with the temporal change in the control group. This nets 
out the effect of any general time trend not associated with the cash transfer on natural resource 
use in the Kaputa, Kalabo, and Shang’ombo districts.  
The key assumptions of our difference-in-difference models are that (1) natural resource 
use is balanced between the control and treatment groups at baseline and (2) the control and 
treatment groups would experience the same general time trend with respect to natural resource 
use in the absence of the cash transfer program. We test that the first assumption holds and while 
the second assumption is fundamentally unknowable, our research design provides strong 
assurance that it holds as well. Because the cash transfer program was randomly assigned within 
and across three districts, treatment status should not be systematically correlated with observed 
or unobserved characteristics of participating households or communities that vary over time or 
are time-invariant. 
We lack baseline data on land use and non-farm business enterprises and therefore run a 
series of first-difference models to examine the impact of cash on these outcomes. These models 
measure the difference between the control and treatment groups in 2012, and therefore assume 
baseline equivalence between these groups regarding land use and business enterprises.  
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We consider two measures of natural resource use: whether households used fuelwood, 
charcoal, bushmeat, or farmland at all; and the amount of the given resource used amongst 
households consuming it at baseline. Examination of these two trends separately allows us to 
explore whether the cash transfer is having strong income effects that induce changes in 
households’ livelihood strategies (i.e., moving into or out of farming), dietary patterns, or 
encourage fuel-switching. It also provides a means of dealing with the high frequency of zeros 
(i.e., non-users) in the fuelwood, charcoal, and bushmeat data when examining the transfer’s 
impact on overall amounts used. 
3.5.1. Testing assumptions of the impact estimates’ econometric models 
We confirm that randomization yielded similar observable characteristics between 
treatment and control households by testing for their equivalence at baseline. We test for 
equivalence at baseline in terms of basic characteristics of the recipient and household and our 
key outcomes of interest (natural resource use) and report these results in Tables 15-17 & Tables 
20-22. We restrict our analysis to just the panel of households that remained in the survey for 
both rounds and cluster robust standard errors at the community-level (and do so for all 
subsequent models). Equivalence at baseline tests are run for all variations of the sample used in 
our impact estimates presented in Section 3.6. 
We find charcoal, fuelwood, and bushmeat use to be well balanced between the control 
and treatment groups at baseline. This equivalence holds for all panel households (Table 20), 
amongst those living more than 10 km from a market (Table 21), and those within 10 km from a 
market (Table 22). On average, amongst consumers, fuelwood consumption is roughly 
equivalent to 14% the value of their food consumption. For charcoal it is about 12%. Bushmeat 
accounts for roughly 12% of bushmeat consumers’ monthly food budget. Similar frequencies 
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and amounts of natural resource use at baseline across the sub-samples suggest remoteness is not 
associated with different fuelwood, charcoal, or bushmeat consumption patterns in these regions 
of Zambia.  
Control and treatment households are generally equivalent along their observable 
characteristics at baseline, though there are important differences amongst those with baseline 
charcoal consumption (n=124) and baseline bushmeat consumption (n=46) (see Table 15). For 
charcoal users, control households are farther from markets and a greater percentage live below 
the poverty line while a higher percentage live in Shang’ombo. Amongst bushmeat consumers, 
the treatment group has a significantly higher percentage living below the poverty line as well as 
slightly different household size and demographic composition. However, when the 10km cutoff 
is used to divide the full panel into two sub-samples, any significant differences between the 
control and treatment groups at baseline disappear (see Tables 16 and 17). 
3.5.2. Identification strategy for impact estimates 
The difference-in-difference model we use to identify the impacts of cash on natural 
resource use can be specified as follows: 
(7) Yigt = B0 + B1Postigt + B2Cashig + B3(Postigt*Cashig) + B4Xig + B5 Zg + Wg +Eigt  
where Yigt measures whether a household i in district g in period t used the natural resource in 
question or the per capita amount used, Postigt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation 
is in 2012, Cashig is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is in the treatment group, Xig 
represents a vector of household and recipient characteristics measured at baseline, Zg, is a vector 
of baseline prices for food and other important consumption goods, Wg is a district fixed effect, 
and Eigt is the error term. We include controls for baseline characteristics and prices and district 
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fixed effects to increase the precision of our estimates. The coefficient of interest in this model is 
B3, which captures the effect of being in a treatment community on natural resource use.  
Because we lack baseline data on land use and non-farm businesses, we run a series of 
first difference models using the 2012 data to test for the impact of cash. This model is similar to 
Equation (7) and is written as: 
(8) Yigt = B0 + B1Cashig + B2Xig + B3 Zg + Wg +Eigt  
Here, the treatment effect is captured by B1. 
3.6. Results 
We do not find evidence that the cash transfer program significantly affects consumption 
of fuelwood or bushmeat. Cash does, however, significantly increase both the decision to use 
charcoal and the amount used amongst those consuming it at baseline. However, these average 
impacts obscure the heterogeneous effects of distance to market and district. While cash 
increases the probability of using charcoal by 8 percentage points, on average (Table 23), it has 
no impact on the decision to use charcoal amongst those more than 10km from a market (Table 
28), while increasing this likelihood by 11 percentage points for households within 10km of a 
market (Table 26). Given that between 68% and 73% of charcoal users (at baseline) live in 
Kaputa (Table 15) and 25 of the 36 charcoal businesses are located there, we also investigate the 
impacts of cash on charcoal use in Kaputa district. We find that cash increases the likelihood of 
charcoal use in Kaputa by 24 percentage points (Table 24).    
We also find that impacts of cash on both the decision to farm and the total area of land 
used vary according to market access. While we do not detect an impact of cash on the decision 
to farm amongst the full panel (Table 23) or those living within 10km of a market (Table 26), 
cash significantly increases the likelihood of farming by six percentage points amongst those 
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living more than 10km from markets (Table 28). In terms of land area used, cash increases the 
area farmed by 21% amongst those within 10km of a market (Table 27) and by 28% for those 
living more than 10km from a market.     
Cash significantly increases the likelihood of owning a non-farm business and these 
impacts are most pronounced for those living close to markets. For these households, cash 
increases the likelihood of owning any non-farm business by 23 percentage points; a charcoal, 
fish, or hay business by 10 percentage points; and all other businesses by 14 percentage points 
(Table 32). But for households living more than 10km from a market, cash has no impact on 
natural-resource based businesses and increases the probability of owning a non-farm business in 
general by only 11 percentage points (Table 31).  
We also investigate if cash has differential impacts on land use amongst those with a non-
farm business. While we don’t find evidence that cash affects the decision to farm for those 
owning a business, we do find that cash increases the area farmed for these households – though, 
again, impacts are heterogeneous according to market access. Amongst those close to markets, 
cash does not appear to affect the area farmed. However, amongst business-owners living far 
from markets, cash increases the area farmed by 20%.  
3.7. Discussion and conclusions 
Our findings provide further evidence of the complexity of poverty-environment 
relationships. We find that, on average, cash increases the likelihood of using charcoal and 
owning a non-farm business as well as the land area used for farming. Even amongst households 
owning a non-farm business, cash, on average, increases the area farmed. However, these 
average impacts mask substantial heterogeneity in resource use, moderated by households’ 
distance to market. For charcoal, we see that cash only increases use amongst those households 
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living within 10km of a market. On the decision to farm, cash only has an impact for those 
households living far from markets. And the impacts of cash on land area farmed are greater for 
households more than 10km from a food market. We also see that cash has a higher likelihood of 
increasing the ownership of non-farm businesses amongst those living closer to markets and has 
no impact on natural resource-based businesses for those living far from markets. It also appears 
that non-farm business owners living close to markets do not use the cash to increase the area of 
their farms, while those living far from markets do.  
Taken together, these results show that in this particular region of Zambia, the biggest 
impacts of a cash transfer program on natural resources – in the short-run – come from charcoal 
and small-holder farming. Our findings also demonstrate that rural households living close to 
markets are more likely to use the transfer to diversify their livelihood strategies, which may 
indicate a transition out of farming to non-farm enterprises.  
What are the implications of these findings for policy and programming targeting rural 
environment and development issues? First, extending cash transfers to households living close 
to markets may help farmers inclined towards non-farm entrepreneurship to transition out of 
farming. Second, cash transfers may also cause these same households to increase their 
consumption and/or production of charcoal. Given that charcoal is the number one driver of 
deforestation in Zambia (Day et al., 2014) and many other regions of Africa, development 
programs should consider pairing cash transfers with alternative fuel programs and heightened 
attention to charcoal supply chains. Third, because households living far from markets will likely 
use cash to expand their farms, cash transfer programs may wish to consider increasing 
agricultural extension services in these areas to encourage land-intensive practices and safe use 
of fertilizers and pesticides.
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CHAPTER 4: 
CYCLING OUT OF POVERTY?  
THE IMPACTS OF CASH TRANSFERS AND BICYCLES ON MARKET ACTIVITY IN 
RURAL ZAMBIA 
4.1. Introduction 
Numerous studies demonstrate the effectiveness of cash transfers in increasing poor 
households’ food consumption, production (agricultural and otherwise), and investments in 
human capital (e.g., children’s schooling, vaccinations, and use of health services). While these 
general findings hold in both rural and urban areas, there has been little examination of whether 
the magnitude of results varies according to degree of remoteness and market access. Barrett and 
Swallow (2005) argue that the poor living in many developing economies’ rural areas find 
themselves in “fractal poverty traps,” where the self-reinforcing conditions that cause poverty to 
persist repeat and reinforce each other at micro (household), meso (community), and macro 
(nation-state) scales. Such fractal poverty traps are especially hard to break out of because they 
require simultaneous action at all of these scales. For example, we might expect that in remote 
rural areas the ability of households to convert cash transfers into consumption, production, and 
investment is constrained by their limited access to markets, schools, and health clinics. If so, 
then cash transfer programs operating in remote rural areas should consider whether it is possible 
to couple payments with complementary steps to increase households’ access to markets and 
public services.  
Undertaking major infrastructure projects and expanding transportation networks in rural 
areas requires significant time and money. Are there other strategies policymakers can adopt in 
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the short-term to increase the rural poor’s access to markets? One strategy being promoted by 
numerous NGOs and social enterprises across Africa and other parts of the developing world is 
the disbursement and marketing of bicycles (see work of World Bicycle Relief, Bicycle Aid for 
Africa, and the Village Bicycle Project, among many others). These programs are motivated by 
the belief that owning a bike enables rural households to send their children to school, make 
greater use of health clinics, and increase their sales of agricultural products. For example, World 
Bicycle Relief, which has distributed or sold at least 125,000 bikes and trained more than 800 
mechanics across eleven countries in East and Southern Africa, states that their programs in 
Zambia aim to increase school attendance rates by decreasing travel time and increasing the 
safety of students (especially girls) while in transit; improve students’ test scores by decreasing 
their time spent traveling, allowing more time for studying; and raise farmers’ incomes by 
decreasing travel time to market, thereby increasing the volume of unspoiled agricultural 
products they are able to sell (World Bicycle Relief, 2010a and 2010b).    
In this study we investigate the third causal pathway – the effect of bikes on participation 
in agricultural markets in Zambia. We examine households’ purchase of agricultural inputs and 
their sale of agricultural products and the roles of bike ownership and cash transfers in increasing 
these agricultural inputs and outputs. Building on this investigation of market activity, we also 
look for impacts of bike and cash on ownership of non-farm businesses. Using a panel dataset 
from a randomized evaluation of a cash transfer program in Zambia, we test for both independent 
and multiplicative effects of bikes and cash on our outcomes of interest. 
Despite a proliferation of bicycle initiatives across Africa, there have been no academic 
studies evaluating the impacts of such programs or bicycle ownership itself on African 
households. This study aims to fill this gap in applied development economics. This paper also 
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seeks to identify options for increasing the effectiveness of cash transfer programs in remote 
rural areas by investigating whether the impacts of the transfer vary according to bike ownership.  
4.2. Cash transfers, supply-side constraints, and poverty traps 
Handa and Davis (2006) note there are contradictions in the aim and design of cash 
transfer programs. On the one hand, these programs often claim they aim to reduce poverty in 
both the short-term and the long-term. However, the focus of these programs tends to be on 
human capital accumulation for children – as evidenced by the facts that many transfer programs 
make payment conditional on children’s schooling and health visits and many of the 
unconditional cash transfer programs target families with young children (as in the Zambia Child 
Grant program). This emphasis on children may be neglecting opportunities to reduce poverty 
and foster economic growth in the current generation. 
Another contradiction relates to the importance of distinguishing between transitional 
poverty and chronic poverty and the different strategies that might reduce the incidence of each. 
Cash transfer programs are often described as “safety-net” programs that can help households 
cope with negative shocks. But these programs typically use measures of structural poverty to 
identify beneficiaries and beneficiary communities. This results in programs targeting the 
chronically poor -- and in ignoring the near-poor, who may be at risk of falling into poverty 
(either temporarily or permanently) due to a negative shock. Such targeting methods imply that 
cash transfer programs are trying to lift people out of poverty traps, rather than provide a safety-
net for the near-poor and transitional poor. This raises the question: are small, regular cash 
payments the best policy approach for lifting households above the threshold that characterizes a 
poverty trap?    
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The theory of poverty traps suggests that once households fall below some critical 
threshold of well-being, self-reinforcing conditions will prevent households from escaping 
poverty. Figure 1 presents poverty trap dynamics, as described and depicted by Barrett and 
Swallow (2005). In the space of future well-being mapped onto current well-being, welfare 
dynamics create an S-shaped curve with three equilibrium points as shown in the figure below. 
In this figure, WPL marks the poverty line. Those at the middle equilibrium point (WC) can easily 
be pushed down into the low-level (poor) equilibrium (WL) by negative income or asset shocks 
or pushed up to the high-level (non-poor) equilibrium (WH) by positive shocks. Once households 
find themselves at either the low- or high-level equilibrium they will tend to converge back to 
this point, despite small positive or negative income shocks that temporarily knock them off. 
Those at the low-level equilibrium are thus in a poverty trap; those that move above the middle 
equilibrium are moving along a self-propelled growth trajectory. This implies that those at the 
middle equilibrium are at a highly unstable point, which marks an important threshold.  
Carter and Barrett (2006) argue that in order to identify poverty trap thresholds we need 
to examine households’ assets, rather than just their consumption levels (the standard approach 
for measuring welfare and establishing poverty lines). If, they contend, households are above the 
poverty trap threshold, they can temporarily reduce their consumption or sell off some assets to 
cope with negative income shocks and then use their (remaining) productive assets to build 
themselves back up. However, if their assets fall below this threshold, they will lack the means to 
pull themselves out of poverty and be trapped. These arguments imply that modestly-sized cash 
transfers may not be enough to push households above the critical threshold – unless they enable 
households to obtain the right combination or value of assets. 
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However, as argued by Dercon (2007), measuring such an asset threshold is a nearly 
impossible task since, empirically, it necessitates collapsing a complex array of assets into a one-
dimensional measure – either the value of all assets or the number of a particular type of assets 
(e.g., livestock, land) held by the household. Moreover, the concept of an asset threshold, he 
argues, is predicated on the idea that the key constraint households face is a lack of credit 
markets, which prevents use of intertemporal exchange as a shock-coping strategy. However, 
financial constraints might not be the defining feature of poverty traps. The threshold may 
instead be defined by remoteness and limited access to markets. As Dercon (2007) notes: 
“Maybe what we need to do is to make asset thresholds matter less to escape poverty, by 
making capital accumulation less relevant for escaping poverty. Recent history has taught 
us that this is how large numbers of the poor have escaped their deep deprivation: by 
moving out of agriculture and informal activities, where they need capital to move 
forward, to activities that only involve selling their labour in a context of labour-intensive 
economic growth” (p. 41-42).   
       
Dercon’s argument is in fact congruent with another theory put forward by those arguing 
the notion of asset-based poverty traps. Barrett and Swallow (2005) theorize the existence of 
‘fractal poverty traps’, which they define as self-reinforcing conditions that cause poverty to 
persist that repeat and reinforce each other at micro (household), meso (community), and macro 
(nation-state) scales. Such fractal poverty traps are especially hard to break out of and require, 
they argue, simultaneous action at multiple scales. The idea can be illustrated with the idea of 
financial markets, which they argue are often the principal constraint facing households mired in 
poverty traps. Poor households often lack access to credit and loans because they are poor. At the 
meso-level, communities in rural areas often lack micro-credit institutions due to weak 
infrastructure and institutions. At the macro-level, nations’ ability to borrow may be hindered by 
debts owed on existing loans and the fact they are poor. The constraints thus reinforce each other 
at every level of the poverty trap and these individuals, communities, and countries find 
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themselves in a fractal poverty trap. Rural households may also find themselves in fractal 
poverty traps because they lack markets for land and non-farm labor and face high transaction 
costs for getting goods to market due to a lack of infrastructure. Both Dercon’s argument and the 
concept of fractal poverty traps are also consistent with questions that have been raised in the 
cash transfer literature by Rawlings and Rubio (2005) and Handa and Davis (2006) about the 
need to investigate whether supply-side constraints are blocking households’ ability to escape 
poverty.  
These debates in the literature regarding poverty, assets, and supply-side constraints in 
remote rural areas motivate our examination of whether bicycle ownership increases the 
effectiveness of cash transfers. Clearly, bikes are both an asset and a means of increasing one’s 
market access. While we do not explicitly test for the existence of poverty traps defined by a 
specific asset threshold,14 our investigation of heterogeneous impacts due to bike ownership may 
be able to provide support for the validity of this concept. Carter and Barrett (2007) argue that 
the asset threshold may be identified by either (a) seeing if households’ accumulation of assets 
bifurcates around a specific total value or (b) finding an asset value around which households’ 
behavior bifurcates in response to negative shocks. In this paper, we test if behavior bifurcates 
around an asset threshold (bike ownership) in response to a positive shock. In essence, we are 
testing if the infusion of cash plus a particular asset is able to move households onto a self-
propelled growth trajectory in the context of supply-side constraints.  
4.3. Conceptual framework 
To investigate whether bicycle ownership yields differential impacts of the cash transfer 
on participation in agricultural markets and non-farm businesses, we first develop a theory of 
                                                
14As noted by Carter and Barrett (2006), empirical tests for such dynamic asset thresholds require at least three 
periods of panel data. Qualitative research may also be able to provide evidence for the existence of such thresholds. 
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change that identifies the various ways bikes could affect the transfer’s impacts (see Figure 12). 
Bikes could moderate impacts of the transfer if their ownership is associated with heterogeneous 
impacts. Bikes could operate as a moderator and be exogenous to cash, if their ownership is not 
affected by participation in the cash transfer program; the decision to own a bike could also be 
endogenous to cash if receiving the transfer causes households to purchase bikes. [Note that 
regardless of whether bicycle ownership is exogenous or endogenous to cash, owning a bike is 
still a choice, possibly reflective of other unobserved characteristics, and still needs to be treated 
as a potential source of endogeneity bias.] For example, bikes sold by the World Bicycle 
Program in Zambia cost 680 kwacha ($136 in US Dollars), which is roughly equivalent to 11 
months of the Child Grant Program’s transfers of 60 kwacha per month. Bikes may also mediate 
the impacts of the cash transfer; that is, much of the effect of the transfer on market activity 
could be due to households’ ownership of bikes.   
4.4. Data and descriptive statistics 
The Child Grant Program impact evaluation study collected detailed information about 
households’ consumption, income, assets, and livelihood activities. Households were asked 
about their purchase of agricultural inputs, including seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides, as well as 
their crop sales during the previous agricultural season (spanning 12 months). They were also 
asked about the location for these sales and purchases. Households also reported whether or not 
they owned non-farm businesses. Data on households’ ownership of bikes was collected along 
with ownership information for a long list of assets used to construct household wealth indices. 
Overall, bike ownership more than doubled over the two years of the study from 7% in 
2010 to 15% in 2012 (Table 35). While bike ownership was balanced at baseline between the 
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cash and control group and the increases over time for both groups are substantial, the increase is 
sharper for those participating in the cash transfer program.  
While randomization of the cash transfer succeeded in creating treatment and control 
groups that are nearly identical along observable characteristics, bike owners differ from non-
owners (as well as the general sample) in numerous ways (see Table 36). Bike owners are more 
likely to have attended school, be married, have larger households, and live closer to markets. 
They also have higher food consumption as well as overall consumption. Sixty-eight percent of 
bike owners live in Kaputa District. 
Study households are extremely poor (see Table 36) and most participate in agriculture 
for subsistence only, with little market activity. The vast majority of households in the sample 
produce crops (about 80% at baseline) (Handa et al., 2014), but, in 2010, only 22% of 
households sold crops and only 13% purchased seeds, fertilizer, or pesticides (Table 37). While 
the value of crop sales was balanced between the cash and control group at baseline (for those 
with any crop sales), the cash group had significantly higher spending on agricultural inputs in 
2010.  
Bike owners are more likely to be engaged in agricultural market activity than both non-
owners and the overall study sample (Table 38). Twenty percent of bike owners purchased 
agricultural inputs and 35% sold crops in 2010. However, amongst those with crop sales at 
baseline, the value of sales is not statistically different between the bike owners and non-bike 
owners and is similar to the cash group’s sales value. While spending on agricultural inputs 
amongst those with such spending is not statistically significant between bike owners and non-
bike owners, bike owners’ spending does appear to be much higher and the lack of significance 
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is likely attributable to the small number of those both owning a bike and purchasing agricultural 
inputs in 2010 (only 84 households).   
4.5. Estimation strategy 
There is potential endogeneity bias that needs to be thought about carefully when 
attempting to identify the impact of bikes on economic activity. Because the decision to own a 
bicycle is a choice, it is possibly reflective of other unobservable characteristics of the owner that 
might influence our outcomes of interest. For example, bike owners might be more motivated or 
less risk-averse than non-owners, and thus more likely to own a non-farm business or increase 
their purchase of agricultural inputs or sale of agricultural outputs over time. This potential 
endogeneity of bike ownership therefore needs to be explicitly considered in our impact 
estimates. We address this potential source of bias by including household fixed effects in our 
econometric models, which sweep out the effect of any time-invariant unobservables.15 
We consider the following outcomes of interest in our regressions: (1) whether or not 
households sold any crops, (2) whether or not households purchased agricultural inputs, (3) the 
value of crops sold amongst those with such sales at baseline, (4) the value of agricultural inputs 
purchased amongst those with such purchases at baseline, and (5) whether or not households 
own a non-farm business. We also run series of models that impose no baseline-selling 
restrictions for the value of crop sales and agricultural input purchases. However, our preferred 
sets of models distinguish between the decision to engage in market activity and the volumes 
sold/purchased amongst those already participating in markets. As we will show and discuss in 
                                                
15We also explored the possibility of using an instrumental variables approach in this paper. Instrumenting for bike 
would address two potential sources of endogeneity bias posed by the bike variable (unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity as well as unobserved time-variant heterogeneity). However, because we have panel data and are 
testing for the multiplicative effects of bikes and cash, our models include multiple bike interactions. Models with 
multiple potentially endogenous regressors are beyond the reach of two-stage least squares instrumental variables 
approaches, which allow for only one endogenous regressor. 
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Sections 4.6.2 and 4.7, applying this distinction in our models allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of how cash and bikes impact livelihoods.  
4.5.1. Mediation  
Testing for mediation helps us unpack the ‘black box’ of impact estimates and uncover the 
causal chain linking programs to outcomes. If a variable mediates program impacts, this implies 
that part of any identified program impact is actually due to the mediating variable. For example, 
if cash causes households to purchase bikes, and part of any identified impact of cash on 
increased market activity is actually due to the ownership of bikes, then we would conclude that 
bikes are a mediator and that part of the success of cash transfers is due to their effect on bike 
purchases. 
To test whether bikes mediate impacts of the cash transfer, we first run a series of 
difference-in-difference models to examine whether cash in fact is associated with an increase in 
bike ownership over time. Next, we apply similar models to test for the effect of cash – by itself 
– on our outcomes of interest. The final step is to then add the bike variable to those models 
identifying a significant impact of cash and examine whether adding the bike variable reduces 
the size of the coefficient measuring the impact of cash; if it does, this indicates that bikes 
mediate the effects of cash. To address the potential bias posed by the endogenous choice to own 
a bike, our bike measure for these models excludes those who owned a bike at baseline. Another 
way of addressing this potential bias is to use household fixed-effects models. Therefore, as a 
further robustness check on our pooled difference-in-difference models, which difference out the 
average effect for the control group, we also test for mediation using household fixed-effects, 
which essentially allows each household to serve as a control for itself, giving each it’s own 
intercept and regression line (though all with the same slope). 
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4.5.2. Moderation 
We also investigate whether bikes moderate impacts of the cash transfer; i.e., cause 
heterogeneous treatment effects. To test for moderation, we run triple-difference models, as 
specified in Equation (9) below:  
(9) Yigt = B0 + B1Timeigt + B2Cashig + B3(Timeigt*Cashig) + B4Bikeig(t) + B5(Timeigt*Bikeig(t)) 
+  B6(Cashig*Bikeig(t)) + B7(Cashig*Bikeig(t)*Timeigt) + B8Xig + B9 Zg + Wg +Eigt  
 
where Yigt measures whether household  i  in district  g  in period  t  purchased/sold agricultural 
inputs/outputs or the value of the amount purchased/sold, Timeigt is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the observation is in 2012, Cashig is equal to 1 if the household is in the treatment group, and 
Bikeig(t) is equal to 1 if the household owns a bike. The coefficients of interest in this model are 
B3, which captures the effect of cash, B5, which captures the effect of bicycle ownership, and B7, 
which measures the multiplicative effect of cash and bike. To increase the precision of our 
estimates we include controls for baseline characteristics, baseline prices of food and other 
important consumption goods, and district fixed effects. Equation (9) represents these time-
invariant controls with Xig, Zg, and Wg, respectively; Eigt represents the error term.  
We consider two alternative measures of bike ownership: that measured at baseline and 
that which varies over time. Baseline bike ownership is a “pure” measure of moderation, if we 
are concerned that cash is affecting bicycle ownership over time. However, the weakness of this 
measure is that it misses the large increase in bike ownership over the course of the study. The 
time-varying bike measure assumes that there is not meaningful multicollinearity between bike 
and cash. That is, it assumes that even if regression estimates identify an “effect” of cash on bike 
ownership, it assumes any such effect is due to correlation and not causation. For example, bike 
ownership could have increased in cash villages due to a contemporaneous (and coincidental) 
expansion of bicycle sales points in these communities. 
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We run several other specifications of the general model described in Equation (9) as 
further robustness checks. We examine the effect of bike amongst just the control group and then 
just the treatment group and then the triple-difference model for just those living in Kaputa 
(home to 68% of bike owners). We also consider the variation of our outcome variables 
previously mentioned, which looks at the amounts of agricultural inputs/outputs bought/sold for 
everyone, with no restrictions for market activity at baseline. Finally, we run all of these model 
iterations using household fixed effects as well.  
4.6. Results 
4.6.1. Do bikes mediate the effects of cash? 
We first run a series of models to test the hypothesis that bikes mediate impacts of the 
cash transfer. We begin by investigating whether cash “affects” bicycle ownership and do not 
find strong evidence that is does. While being in the cash treatment group is associated with a 5 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of owning a bike (significant at the 90% level) in the 
pooled difference-in-difference models, this result is not robust to the inclusion of household 
fixed-effects. And, as Table 35 highlights, bicycle ownership dramatically increased in the 
control group between 2010 and 2012 as well.  
We next proceed to estimate the impact of cash by itself and then test whether the 
inclusion of the bike variable in these equations reduces any identified impacts of cash. We find 
that cash increases the likelihood of purchasing agricultural inputs and selling crops, each by 11 
percentage points and each significant at the 99% level. Cash also increases the likelihood of 
owning a non-farm business by 16 percentage points (significant at 99% level). Inclusion of the 
bike variable has little impact on these estimates, indicating that bikes do not mediate cash.  This 
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pattern of pooled difference-in-difference models results is robust to the inclusion of household 
fixed effects.16 
4.6.2. Do bikes moderate the effects of cash? 
We estimate several different versions of the model presented in Equation (9) to test for 
heterogeneous treatment effects, as described in Section 4.5.2. The pattern of results is similar 
for all model specifications (Kaputa only, control group only, treatment group only, inclusion of 
household fixed-effects) and provides evidence that while cash increases the likelihood of 
purchasing agricultural inputs, selling crops, and owning a non-farm business, it does not 
increase the volumes of inputs purchased or crops sold for those with such market activity at 
baseline. However, for those with crop sales at baseline, bicycle ownership significantly and 
substantially increases the value of crops sold. We do not find any evidence of multiplicative 
effects for bikes and cash combined and therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis that there are 
no differential effects of cash on market activity for bike owners. 
We present here results from our preferred set of models: the pooled triple-difference 
models (difference-in-difference models in the case of non-farm business outcomes, for which 
we lack baseline data). The pooled models allow us to explicitly note the various time trends for 
each group (cash, bike, control) and are thus preferred over the fixed-effects models for 
exposition purposes. We include results for both measures of bike ownership (ownership at 
baseline and ownership that varies over time). Regardless of which bike measure is used, cash 
increases the likelihood of selling crops by 12 percentage points, of purchasing agricultural 
                                                
16We also test for mediation when there is no baseline restriction on crop sales or agricultural input purchases. Here 
we do find some weak evidence of mediation. Including the bike variable reduces the effect size of cash by about 9 
kwacha for crop sales and by less than 1 kwacha for agricultural input purchases. However, these models obscure 
the fact that while cash is causing more people to engage in market activity, market sales and purchases in fact go 
down, in general, over time. Therefore, our preferred models estimate effects on values sold and purchased 
conditional on baseline market activity. 
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inputs by 11-12 percentage points, and of owning a non-farm business by 14-15 percentage 
points (Table 39). When the time-varying measure of bikes is used, bikes increase the likelihood 
of purchasing agricultural inputs by a similar amount (though the effect is less significant than it 
is for cash). For those with agricultural input purchases at baseline, neither cash nor bikes has a 
significant effect on the values purchased (Table 40). However, when we apply the time-varying 
measure of bicycle ownership, we see that bikes significantly increase the value of crops sold for 
those with crop sales at baseline by 331 kwacha (Table 40). This amount is equivalent to nearly 
six months of Child Grant Payments or 60% of monthly consumption for a household of average 
size (6 members) living below the poverty line of 93.37 kwacha per person per month. All of 
these results are robust to the inclusion of household fixed-effects.  
The impact of bikes on crop sale values is perhaps one of the more interesting results in 
this paper and we examine it in more detail in Table 41. In Table 41 we see that crop sales were 
balanced at baseline between the cash and control group, between the bike and control group, 
and between those with bikes in the cash group and those with bikes in the control group. We see 
that for those in the control group, crop sales significantly decreased over time by 148 kwacha. 
In the cash treatment group, sales also went down over time, but the decline is not significantly 
different from that experienced by the control group. Households owning bikes, however, were 
able to significantly increase their crop sales over time despite the downward trend.  
As further robustness checks on the above results, we ran several different model 
specifications. When we analyze the effects of cash and bikes on crop sales without the condition 
of baseline market activity using the time-varying measure of bicycle ownership, we find that 
both bikes and cash (independently) increase the value of sales, though the impact of bikes is 
nearly triple that of cash. And when we include household fixed-effects, the impact of cash on 
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crop sale volumes is no longer significant, though the positive impact of bikes remains. These 
results are consistent with the findings from our models that analyze the effect of bikes 
separately for the control and cash treatment groups. Again using the time-varying measure of 
bikes, we find that bike ownership increases crop sales by 321.93 kwacha (significant at the 90% 
level) amongst the control group but has no effect amongst the cash treatment group. This pooled 
model result is robust to the inclusion of household fixed-effects. 
4.6.3. Causal mechanisms 
We next considered variations in households’ distance to markets and investigated 
whether there might be heterogeneous effects of bikes according to market distance (i.e., perhaps 
bikes are more important for market activity for those living farther from markets). We explored 
this question graphically to test for both marginal and threshold effects but found no graphical 
indication that market distance moderates the effect of bicycle ownership on any of our outcomes 
of interest.  
Finally, we tried to investigate why it might be that bikes have an impact on crop sale 
volumes. One likely causal mechanism is that bikes reduce the time to market and therefore 
allow more market trips and/or access to markets that are farther away and might offer higher 
prices. In the 2012 survey, households were asked where they purchased agricultural inputs and 
sold crops (Table 42). Using these data we ran difference-in-difference models to see if bicycle 
ownership affected whether households sold crops or purchased inputs in their village or in a 
neighboring village/closest town. We did not find any evidence that bikes affected the location of 
agricultural market activity. This suggests that bikes may be facilitating higher crop sales 
because they are allowing for multiple market trips, rather than facilitating access to more distant 
markets. 
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4.7. Discussion and conclusions 
While we do not find support for our hypothesis that bikes enable households receiving 
cash transfers to make more productive uses of the transfer by facilitating their market access, we 
do find evidence that cash and bikes are differentially effective in helping rural households 
increase their market activity. We find consistent evidence that the income effects of cash 
transfers are powerful enough to shift livelihood strategies. Cash allows households to diversify 
their livelihood strategies by increasing the ownership of non-farm businesses. Cash transfers 
can also convert subsistence farmers into small-scale farmers able to sell some of their 
agricultural production at markets and purchase seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides to enhance farm 
productivity. These changes to livelihood strategies have important implications for households’ 
ability to avoid and escape poverty traps, especially in the context of climate change. For 
example, a recent study of various “climate-smart agricultural practices” in Zambia finds that 
“Timely access to fertilizer is the most robust determinant of yields and resilience [to weather 
shocks]” (Arslan et al., 2015, p. v).  
We also find consistent evidence that bikes enable those already engaged in agricultural 
markets to increase their crop sales over time, even in the context of declining crop revenues. 
This finding provides suggestive evidence that bikes may be an important asset for helping 
households maintain self-propelled growth trajectories in the context of repeated negative shocks 
that risk trapping households in poverty. Further research could test this hypothesis more 
explicitly by using at least three time periods of data and testing whether bicycle ownership 
marks a critical threshold for how households respond to shocks, in both consumption and 
production. 
Our analysis also leads us to make a methodological conclusion. Our study shows that it 
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is important to distinguish between agricultural market activity, in and of itself, and changes in 
volumes traded in markets when analyzing the effect of programs in economies dominated by 
subsistence farming. The transition from growing crops for pure subsistence to growing crops for 
both consumption and income marks an important shift in the development of rural agricultural 
economies. This impact of programs can be missed if market participation is not analyzed 
independently. Additionally, examining just changes in volumes of agricultural goods traded can 
mask the differential effects of programs on (a) enabling participation in agricultural markets 
versus (b) increasing trade amongst those already engaged in markets. For example, in our study, 
agricultural sales went down, in general, over time, but because the cash transfer program 
increased household’s ability to sell crops, analyzing just the effect of cash on the value of sales 
would fail to identify these two different dynamics and lead to the conclusion that the program 
increased crop sales (when in fact it just increased the number of sellers).  
Finally, it should be noted that this study was powered to test the effects of cash – not the 
effects of bikes. The number of households owning bikes in our sample is quite small and the 
inability to detect significant impacts of bikes on outcomes other than crop sales – or 
multiplicative effects of bikes and cash – can not be taken as definitive.  
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APPENDIX 1: FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Welfare dynamics under the poverty trap hypothesis 
 
From Barrett and Swallow (2005), p. 4 
 
 
Figure 2. Heterogeneous impacts of cash on decision to use fuelwood by market distance in 
2012  
 
 
 
 
 
 79 
 
Figure 3. Heterogeneous impacts of cash on per capita fuelwood consumption by market 
distance in 2012  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Heterogeneous impacts of cash on decision to use charcoal by market distance in 
2012  
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Figure 5. Heterogeneous impacts of cash on per capita charcoal consumption by market 
distance in 2012  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Heterogeneous impacts of cash on decision to consume bushmeat by market 
distance in 2012 
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Figure 7. Heterogeneous impacts of cash on per capita bushmeat consumption by market 
distance in 2012 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Heterogeneous impacts of cash on decision to farm by market distance in 2012 
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Figure 9. Heterogeneous impacts of cash on per capita area farmed by market distance in 
2012 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Heterogeneous impacts of cash on per capita area farmed by market distance 
for non-farm business owners in 2012 
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Figure 11. Heterogeneous impacts of cash on ownership of non-farm businesses by market 
distance in 2012 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Theory of change: Potential role of bikes in both mediating and moderating 
impacts of the cash transfer on market activity 
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APPENDIX 2: TABLES 
 
Table 1. Study sample sizes1                                             
 Treatment Control Total 
2010 1,259 1,260 2,519 
2012 1,145 1,153 2,298 
    
Total 2,404 2,413 4,817 
1 221 households migrated out of the sample 
 
 
Table 2. Shocks experienced during 12 months prior to collection of baseline data in 2010 
and round 2 in 2012 
  2010   2012  
 Full sample 
(n=2,519) 
Treatment 
(n=1,260) 
Control 
(n=1,259) 
Full sample 
(n=2,298) 
Treatment 
(n=1,153) 
Control 
(n=1,145) 
       
No shock 922 
(37)% 
476 
(38)% 
446 
(35%) 
341 
(15%) 
169 
(15%) 
172 
(15%) 
       
Any shock 1,597 
(63%) 
784 
(62%) 
813 
(65%) 
1,957 
(85%) 
984 
(85%) 
973 
(85%) 
       
   Agricultural   
   production and 
   price shocks 
1319 
(52%) 
614 
(49%) 
705 
(56%) 
1852 
(81%) 
939 
(81%) 
913 
(80%) 
       
        Weather   
        shocks 
1058 
(42%) 
484 
(38%) 
574 
(46%) 
1632 
(71%) 
828 
(72%) 
804 
(70%) 
       
       Crop and   
       price shocks 
740 
(29%) 
352 
(28%) 
388 
(31%) 
1404 
(61%) 
681 
(59%) 
723 
(63%) 
       
   Asset, labor,   
   and other   
   income shocks 
694 
(28%) 
357 
(28%) 
337 
(27%) 
822 
(36%) 
380 
(33%) 
442 
(39%) 
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Table 3. Specific shocks experienced 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2010 2012 
 
Negative Shocks 
Full sample 
(n=2,519) 
Treatment 
(n=1,260) 
Control 
(n=1,259) 
Full sample 
(n=2,298) 
Treatment 
(n=1,153) 
Control 
(n=1,145) 
       
Agricultural production and price shocks 
Flood 851 
(34%) 
375 
(30%) 
476 
(38%) 
690 
 (30%) 
382 
 (33%) 
308 
 (27%) 
Food price change 368 
(15%) 
180 
(14%) 
188 
(15%) 
813 
 (35%) 
401 
 (35%) 
412 
 (36%) 
Drought 318 
(13%) 
160 
(13%) 
158 
(13%) 
 1080 
(47%) 
536 
 (46%) 
544 
 (48%) 
Crop disease/pests 172 
(7%) 
88 
(7%) 
84 
(7%) 
244  
(11%) 
115 
 (10%) 
129 
 (11%) 
Storms 95 
(4%) 
43 
(3%) 
52 
(4%) 
63 
 (3%) 
17  
(1%) 
46 
 (4%) 
Crop price change 78 
(3%) 
25 
(2%) 
53 
(4%) 
174 
 (8%) 
80 
 (7%) 
94 
 (8%) 
Crops damaged in storage 62 
(2%) 
30 
(2%) 
32 
(3%) 
59 
 (3%) 
27 
 (2%) 
32 
 (3%) 
Input price change 60 
(2%) 
29 
(2%) 
31 
(2%) 
114 
 (5%) 
58 
 (5%) 
56 
 (5%) 
       
Asset, labor, and other income shocks 
Illness 468 
(19%) 
243 
(19%) 
225 
(18%) 
504 
(22%) 
210 
 (18%) 
294 
 (26%) 
Business collapse 97 
(4%) 
50 
(4%) 
47 
(4%) 
37 
(2%) 
22 
 (2%) 
15 
 (1%) 
Death other member 74 
(3%) 
36 
(3%) 
38 
(3%) 
107 
(5%) 
55 
 (5%) 
52 
 (5%) 
Death household head 65 
(3%) 
30 
(2%) 
35 
(3%) 
30 
(1%) 
15 
 (1%) 
15 
 (1%) 
Livestock disease 51 
(2%) 
23 
(2%) 
28 
(2%) 
250 
(11%) 
119 
 (10%) 
131 
 (11%) 
Person joined household 39 
(2%) 
21 
(2%) 
18 
(1%) 
50 
(2%) 
24 
 (2%) 
26 
 (2%) 
Injury 37 
(1%) 
20 
(2%) 
17 
(1%) 
13 
(1%) 
6 
 (1%) 
7 
 (1%) 
Inability to pay back loan 19 
(1%) 
10 
(1%) 
9 
(1%) 
4 
(<1%) 
3 
 (<1%) 
1 
 (<1%) 
Less loans/gifts 11 
(<1%) 
6 
(<1%) 
5 
(<1%) 
9 
(<1%) 
4 
 (<1%) 
5 
 (<1%) 
Job loss 9 
(<1%) 
6 
(<1%) 
3 
(<1%) 
11 
(<1%) 
6 
 (1%) 
5 
 (<1%) 
Conflict 8 
(<1%) 
1 
(<1%) 
7 
(1%) 
18 
(1%) 
12  
(1%) 
6 
 (1%) 
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Table 4. Covariance of shocks: Average percent reporting the shock within a community 
cluster, averaged across communities 
  2010   2012  
 
Negative shocks 
Full sample 
(n=90) 
Treatment 
(n=45) 
Control 
(n=45) 
Full sample 
(n=90) 
Treatment 
(n=45) 
Control 
(n=45) 
       
Any shock 63% 62% 65% 85% 85% 85% 
       
Agricultural production and price shocks 
Flood 34% 30% 38% 29% 32% 26% 
Food price change 15% 14% 15% 36% 35% 36% 
Drought 13% 13% 13% 47% 47% 47% 
Crop disease/pests 7% 7% 7% 10% 10% 11% 
Storms 4% 3% 4% 3% 2% 4% 
Crop price change 3% 2% 4% 8% 7% 8% 
Crops damaged in storage 2% 2% 3% 3% 2% 3% 
Input price change 2% 2% 2% 5% 5% 5% 
       
Asset, labor, and other income shocks 
Illness 19% 20% 18% 22% 18% 26% 
Business collapse 4% 4% 4% 2% 2% 1% 
Death other member 3% 3% 3% 5% 5% 5% 
Death household head 3% 2% 3% 1% 1% 1% 
Livestock disease 2% 2% 2% 11% 11% 12% 
Person joined household 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 3% 
Injury 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Inability to pay back loan 1% 1% 1% <1% <1% <1% 
Less loans/gifts <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% 
Job loss <1% <1% <1% <1% 1% <1% 
Conflict <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% 
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Table 5. Coping strategies employed by households experiencing negative shocks 
 
 
 
Coping strategy 
 
Full sample 
(n=1,597) 
2010 
Treatment 
(n=784) 
 
Control 
(n=813) 
 
Full sample 
(n=1,957) 
2012 
Treatment 
(n=984) 
 
Control 
(n=973) 
       
Coping strategies associated 
with poverty traps 
Did nothing 664 
(42%) 
288 
(37%) 
376 
(46%) 
988 
 (62%) 
457 
 (46%) 
531 
 (55%) 
 
Piece work for others (farm 
or non-farm) 
642  
(40%) 
313 
(40%) 
329  
(40%) 
645 
(33%) 
314 
(32%) 
331 
(34%) 
 
Reduced food consumption 228 
(14%) 
 
113 
(14%) 
115 
(14%) 
223 
(11%) 
 
93 
(9%) 
130 
(13%) 
 
Sold assets 40 
(3%) 
20 
(3%) 
20 
(2%) 
64 
 (3%) 
26 
 (3%) 
38 
 (4%) 
 
Sent kids to 
relatives/friends 
26 
(2%) 
14 
(2%) 
12 
(1%) 
18 
 (1%) 
9 
 (1%) 
9 
 (1%) 
 
Sent kids to work/sell 5 
(<1%) 
2 
(<1%) 
3 
(<1%) 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
Other coping strategies 
Loans/gifts from family, 
friends, or lender 
394 
(25%) 
174 
(22%) 
220 
(27%) 
274 
 (14%) 
131 
 (13%) 
143 
 (15%) 
 
Worked more hours, 
grew/sold more crops, or 
started a business 
 
325  
(20%) 
175  
(22%) 
150  
(18%) 
371  
(19%) 
208  
(21%) 
163  
(17%) 
 
Sought help from 
government, NGO, or 
clinic 
244  
(15%) 
129  
(16%) 
115  
(14%) 
235 
(12%) 
95 
(10%) 
140 
(14%) 
 
Spent savings 185 
(12%) 
83 
(11%) 
102 
(13%) 
275 
 (14%) 
169 
 (17%) 
105 
 (11%) 
 
Work-for-food or Work-
for-assets program 
140 
(9%) 
64 
(8%) 
76 
(9%) 
72 
 (4%) 
40 
 (4%) 
32 
 (3%) 
 
Reduced non-food 
expenses 
136 
(9%) 
74 
(10%) 
62 
(8%) 
291 
 (15%) 
160 
 (16%) 
131 
 (13%) 
 
Migrated for work or 
moved house/field 
47  
(3%) 
16  
(2%) 
31  
(4%) 
16 
(1%) 
10 
(1%) 
6 
(1%) 
 
Used cash transfer  
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
25 
(3%) 
 
0 
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Table 6. Mean characteristics and equivalence at baseline tests for full panel as well as four shock sub-group panels in 20101 
 Full 
Panel 
No shock 
either round 
Shock 
round 1 only 
Shock 
round 2 only 
Shocked 
both rounds 
 
Sample size 
Treatment 
(1,153) 
Control 
(1,145) 
Treatment 
(55) 
Control 
(67) 
Treatment 
(114) 
Control 
(105) 
Treatment 
(373) 
Control 
(337) 
Treatment 
(611) 
Control 
(636) 
Recipient characteristics          
Age  30 30 28 30 31 30 30 29 30 30 
Attended school  73% 70% 78%* 62%* 72% 76% 71% 66% 75% 72% 
Married  74% 71% 71% 64% 74% 66% 79% 75% 71% 71% 
Male 1.2% 0.5% 0% 0% 3%* 0%* 1%* 0%* 1% 1% 
           
Household characteristics          
Wealth index 0.002 -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 0.08 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 
Below 2010 poverty line  92% 92% 93% 96% 85% 89% 94% 94% 92% 91% 
Household size 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Members age 0-5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Members age 6-12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Members age 13-18 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Members age 19-35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Members age 36-55 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Members age 56-79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Members 70+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kilometers to food 
market  
16 22 23 34 20 30 14* 23* 16 19 
           
Percent from each 
district 
          
Kaputa 30% 29% 33% 48% 24% 38% 39% 39% 25% 21% 
Kalabo  35% 35% 29% 36% 50% 44% 23% 25% 41% 39% 
Shang’ombo 35% 35% 38% 16% 26% 18% 39% 36% 34% 40% 
           
Revealed coping strategies          
Monthly per capita food 
consumption (kwacha) 
30.16 28.50 24.03 24.89 40.73*** 32.57*** 26.61 26.58 31.71 29.60 
Severely food insecure 90% 90% 96% 88% 87% 92% 91% 90% 89% 90% 
1All samples restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012. Means and tests for significant difference are regression-adjusted to account for clustered 
randomized design. Revealed coping strategy regressions include controls for recipient characteristics (age, education, marital status), household characteristics 
(wealth, household size and demographic composition, distance to food market), district fixed effects and a vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, 
fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap). *** indicates significantly different from control group at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level 
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Table 7. Equivalence at baseline tests for full panel’s exposure to shocks and stated coping 
strategies in 20101,2 
 Significantly different for treatment households 
Shocks  
Agricultural production or price shock 7 percentage points less likely* 
Asset, labor, and other income shock  
Any shock  
  
Stated coping strategies associated with poverty 
traps 
 
Did nothing 9 percentage points less likely** (Other Shocks) 
Piece work for others (farm or non-farm) 9 percentage points more likely* (Other Shocks) 
Reduced food consumption  
  
Other stated coping strategies  
Loans/gifts from family, friends, or lender 10 percentage points less likely** (Other Shocks) 
Worked more hours, grew/sold more crops, or 
started a business 
5 percentage points more likely* (Ag/Price Shocks) 
Sought help from government, NGO, or clinic  
Spent savings  
Work-for-food or Work-for-assets program 3 percentage points more likely* (Other Shocks) 
Reduced non-food expenses 3 percentage points more likely* (Ag/Price Shocks) 
 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012. Regressions include controls for recipient 
characteristics (age, education, marital status), household characteristics (wealth, household size and demographic 
composition, distance to food market), district fixed effects and a vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, 
fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap).  Robust standard errors are clustered at the community level to account 
for the clustered randomized design. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and 
* at the 90% level. 
2Analysis restricted to those coping strategies employed by 5% or more of households in at least one of the four 
time/treat sub-groups (i.e., 2010 control group that experienced shock, 2010 treatment group that experienced shock, 
etc.). 
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Table 8. Equivalent time trends between treatment and control households with respect to 
shock exposure1  
  
Dependent variables (1/0 – Linear probability models) 
 Agricultural production 
or price shock 
Asset, labor, and 
other income shock Any shock 
Constant 0.54*** 
(0.13) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
0.57*** 
(0.12) 
Time 0.24*** 
(0.04) 
0.12*** 
(0.05) 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
Treatment 
household 
-0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Treatment 
household * Time 
0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
    
Recipient characteristics   
Age  0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Attended school  0.05*** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Married  0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
    
Household characteristics   
Wealth index -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
Household size 0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
Members age 0-5 0.0002 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(0.02) 
Members age 6-12 -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(0.02) 
Members age 13-18 -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Members age 19-35 -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.005 
(0.02) 
Members age 36-55 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Kilometers to food 
market (logged) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
    
Regional characteristics   
Kaputa District -0.22*** 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
Shangombo District -0.03 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.005 
(0.04) 
    
N 4518 4518 4518 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. Kalabo district omitted. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, 
and * at the 90% level. 
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Table 9. The impact of cash on coping strategies associated with poverty traps amongst 
households experiencing negative income shocks in the 12 months prior to collection of 
round 2 data in 20121,2 
Dependent variable: coping strategy employed (1) – Linear probability model 
    
 Did Nothing Piece work for 
others 
Reduced food 
consumption 
 Ag/Price Ag/Price Ag/Price 
Constant 0.87*** 
(0.18) 
0.19 
(0.14) 
0.03 
(0.15) 
Cash -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Recipient characteristics 
Age -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Attended school 0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.007 
(0.02) 
Married -0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Household characteristics 
Wealth index -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
Household size -0.04 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
Members age 0-5 0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
Members age 6-12 0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Members age 13-18 0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Members age 19-35 0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Members age 36-55 0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Kilometers to food market (logged) 0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
Regional characteristics 
Kaputa 0.15** 
(0.06) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10* 
(0.05) 
Shangombo -0.49*** 
(0.06) 
0.45*** 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
    
N 1823 1823 1823 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. Kalabo district omitted. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, 
and * at the 90% level. 
2Analysis restricted to those coping strategies (1) employed by 5% or more of households in at least one of the four 
time/treat sub-groups (i.e., 2010 control group that experienced shock, 2010 treatment group that experienced shock, 
etc.) and (2) balanced at baseline. No coping strategies associated with poverty traps met these criteria in the case of 
non-agricultural/price shocks.
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Table 10. The impact of cash on coping strategies not associated with poverty traps amongst households experiencing negative 
income shocks in the 12 months prior to collection of round 2 data in 20121,2 
Dependent variable: coping strategy employed (1) – Linear probability model 
 
 Loans or 
gifts 
Grew/sold 
additional crops, 
worked more, 
started business 
Sought help from 
 government or NGO 
Spent 
 savings 
Work-for-food/ 
Work-for-assets 
 Ag/Price Other Ag/Price Other Ag/Price Other Ag/Price 
Constant 0.005 
(0.10) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.15 
(0.21) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.17) 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
Cash 0.002 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.12** 
(0.06) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.0004 
(0.01) 
Recipient characteristics        
Age 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
0.0003 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Attended school 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Married -0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.08*** 
(0.03) 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Household characteristics        
Wealth index 0.0002 
(0.005) 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.003) 
Household size -0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01* 
(0.004) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.03) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Members age 0-5 0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(0.03) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
Members age 6-12 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.0002 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
Members age 13-18 0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.005) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.03) 
0.002 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Members age 19-35 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Members age 36-55 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.01* 
(0.004) 
0.0001 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.004 
(0.04) 
-0.0002 
(0.01) 
Kilometers to food market (logged) -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Regional characteristics        
Kaputa -0.05* 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.20*** 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
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Shangombo -0.01 
(0.04) 
0.14** 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.09 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.10* 
(0.06) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
        
N 1823 809 1823 809 1823 809 1823 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the community level to account for the clustered 
randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, 
salt, hand soap, liquid soap) not shown. Kalabo district omitted. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% 
level. 
2Analysis restricted to those coping strategies (1) employed by 5% or more of households in at least one of the four time/treat sub-groups (i.e., 2010 control 
group that experienced shock, 2010 treatment group that experienced shock, etc.) and (2) balanced at baseline. 
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Table 11. The impact of cash on food consumption amongst households experiencing and 
avoiding negative income shocks1,2 
Dependent variable: Per capita food consumption (logged) 
    
 No shock 
either round 
Shock 
round 2 only 
Shock 
both rounds 
Constant 10.5*** 
(0.49) 
10.4*** 
(0.25) 
10.7*** 
(0.22) 
Time 0.39*** 
(0.09) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.06) 
Cash 0.07 
(0.17) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
Cash*Time 0.31* 
(0.17) 
0.35*** 
(0.10) 
0.29*** 
(0.09) 
Recipient characteristics    
Age 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
Attended school 0.06 
(0.11) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
Married -0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Household characteristics   
Wealth index 0.11 
(0.07) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.16*** 
(0.02) 
Household size -0.12 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
Members age 0-5 -0.08 
(0.12) 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
-0.10** 
(0.05) 
Members age 6-12 -0.05 
(0.12) 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
Members age 13-18 0.04 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
Members age 19-35 0.18 
(0.13) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
Members age 36-55 0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
Kilometers to food market 
(logged) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
    
Regional characteristics   
Kaputa -0.38** 
(0.16) 
-0.22*** 
(0.08) 
-0.20*** 
(0.07) 
Shangombo -0.45*** 
(0.12) 
-0.31*** 
(0.06) 
-0.24*** 
(0.07) 
    
N 240 1393 2455 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. Kalabo district omitted. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, 
and * at the 90% level. 
2Analysis restricted to those shock groups balanced at baseline along per capita food consumption. 
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Table 12. The impact of cash on food security amongst households experiencing and 
avoiding negative income shocks1 
Dependent variable: Severely food insecure (1) – Linear Probability Model 
     
 No shock 
either round 
Shock 
round 1 only 
Shock 
round 2 only 
Shock 
both rounds 
Constant 1.40*** 
(0.25) 
1.0*** 
(0.18) 
0.94*** 
(0.10) 
1.17*** 
(0.11) 
Time -0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
Cash 0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Cash*Time -0.24** 
(0.11) 
-0.0004 
(0.07) 
-0.25*** 
(0.04) 
-0.20*** 
(0.04) 
Recipient characteristics    
Age -0.004 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.0005 
(0.001) 
Attended school 0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
Married -0.03 
(0.05) 
0.004 
(0.05) 
-0.05* 
(0.03) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
Household characteristics    
Wealth index -0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Household size 0.05 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Members age 0-5 -0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
Members age 6-12 -0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Members age 13-18 -0.09 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Members age 19-35 -0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.003 
(0.03) 
Members age 36-55 -0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
0.004 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Kilometers to food 
market (logged) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
     
Community characteristics    
Kaputa 0.09 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
Shangombo -0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.15* 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
     
N 240 428 1385 2445 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. Kalabo district omitted. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, 
and * at the 90% level. 
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Table 13. The impact of cash on food consumption amongst households experiencing and 
avoiding negative income shocks, controlling for the effect of shock covariance1,2 
Dependent variable: Per capita food consumption (logged) 
 No shock 
either round 
Shock 
round 2 only  
Shock 
both rounds 
Constant 10.3*** 
(0.50) 
10.2*** 
(0.27) 
10.5*** 
(0.22) 
Time 0.35*** 
(0.09) 
0.16** 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
Cash 0.06 
(0.16) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
Cash*Time 0.31* 
(0.17) 
0.34*** 
(0.10) 
0.28*** 
(0.08) 
Community shock covariance 
(fraction excluding household) 
0.25 
(0.24) 
0.34** 
(0.14) 
0.29** 
(0.14) 
   
Recipient characteristics   
Age 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
Attended school 0.06 
(0.11) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
Married -0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Household characteristics   
Wealth index 0.10 
(0.07) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.16*** 
(0.02) 
Household size -0.11 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Members age 0-5 -0.09 
(0.12) 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
-0.10** 
(0.05) 
Members age 6-12 -0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
Members age 13-18 0.03 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
Members age 19-35 0.17 
(0.13) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
Members age 36-55 0.14 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
Kilometers to food market (logged) -0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
Regional characteristics   
Kaputa -0.33* 
(0.18) 
-0.19** 
(0.08) 
-0.16** 
(0.07) 
Shangombo -0.45*** 
(0.12) 
-0.34*** 
(0.07) 
-0.22*** 
(0.07) 
    
N 240 1393 2455 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. Kalabo district omitted. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, 
and * at the 90% level. 
2Analysis restricted to those shock groups balanced at baseline along per capita food consumption. 
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Table 14. The impact of cash on food security amongst households experiencing and 
avoiding negative income shocks, controlling for the effect of shock covariance1 
Dependent variable: Severely food insecure (1) – Linear Probability Model 
 No shock 
either round  
Shock 
round 1 only 
Shock 
round 2 only 
Shock 
both rounds  
Constant 1.30*** 
(0.28) 
1.23*** 
(0.18) 
0.85*** 
(0.13) 
1.08*** 
(0.13) 
Time -0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.08** 
(0.04) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
Cash 0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Cash*Time -0.24** 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.26*** 
(0.04) 
-0.20*** 
(0.04) 
Community shock covariance 
(fraction excluding household) 
0.21 
(0.20) 
-0.33*** 
(0.11) 
0.15 
(0.09) 
0.14* 
(0.07) 
    
Recipient characteristics    
Age -0.004 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.001) 
Attended school 0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.002 
(0.04) 
-0.004 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
Married -0.03 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.05** 
(0.03) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
Household characteristics    
Wealth index -0.04* 
(0.03) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Household size 0.06 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Members age 0-5 -0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
Members age 6-12 -0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Members age 13-18 -0.09 
(0.11) 
-0.09* 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Members age 19-35 -0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Members age 36-55 -0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
0.004 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Kilometers to food market 
(logged) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Community characteristics    
Kaputa 0.14 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Shangombo -0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.15* 
(0.08) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
     
N 240 428 1385 2445 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. Kalabo district omitted. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, 
and * at the 90% level.
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Table 15. Mean characteristics and tests for equivalence between control and treatment groups at 2010 baseline1  
 Panel households, all 
Panel households, 2010 
fuelwood >0 
Panel households, 
2010 charcoal >0 
Panel households, 2010 
bushmeat >0 
 Treatment (n=1,153) 
Control 
(n=1,145) 
Treatment 
(n=1,044) 
Control 
(n=1,033) 
Treatment 
(n=76) 
Control 
(n=48) 
Treatment 
(n=24) 
Control 
(n=22) 
Recipient characteristics 
Age 30 30 30 29 32 31 29 28 
Attended school 73% 70% 73% 69% 91% 81% 88% 77% 
Married 74% 71% 74% 71% 70% 73% 83% 82% 
Male 1.2% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% 
         
Household characteristics 
Wealth index 0.002 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 1.20 0.67 0.47 -0.04 
Below 2010 poverty line 92% 92% 92% 91% 89%** 100%** 92%** 68%** 
Monthly per capita food consumption 
(kwacha) 30.16 28.50 35.91 34.48 38.96 28.76 53.82 64.42 
Severely food insecure 90% 90% 89% 89% 93% 94% 65% 77% 
Household size 6 6 6 6 7 6 6** 5** 
Members age 0-5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Members age 6-12 1 1 1 1 2 2 1** 1** 
Members age 13-18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Members age 19-35 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Members age 36-55 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Members age 56-69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Members 70+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kilometers to market 16 22 17 21 8* 22* 16 24 
         
Percent from each district 
Kaputa 30% 30% 26% 25% 73% 68% 50% 50% 
Kalabo 35% 35% 38% 37% 1% 17% 4% 23% 
Shang’ombo 35% 35% 36% 38% 26%* 15%* 46% 27% 
1All samples restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012. Means and tests for significant difference are regression-adjusted to account for clustered 
randomized design. Monthly per capita food consumption and food security regressions include controls for recipient characteristics (age, education, marital 
status), household characteristics (wealth, household size, and demographic composition), district fixed effects, and a vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, 
rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap). *** indicates significant differences between the treatment and control groups at the 99% level, ** at the 
95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
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Table 16. Mean characteristics and tests for equivalence between control and treatment groups at 2010 baseline amongst 
households more than 10km from a market1  
 Panel households, 
 all 
Panel households, 
2010 fuelwood >0 
Panel households, 
2010 charcoal >0 
 Treatment 
(n=578) 
Control 
(n=623) 
Treatment 
(n=523) 
Control 
(n=562) 
Treatment 
(n=27) 
Control 
(n=25) 
Recipient characteristics 
Age  29 30 29 30 33 29 
Attended school  75% 70% 74% 70% 96% 76% 
Married  77% 68% 76% 67% 78% 80% 
Male <1% <1% <1% <1% 4% <1% 
       
Household characteristics 
Wealth index -0.18 -0.17 -0.26 -0.20 0.84 0.35 
Below 2010 poverty line  90% 90% 90% 89% 93% 100% 
Monthly per capita food consumption (kwacha) 40.46 38.69 40.60 38.74 38.62 31.31 
Severely food insecure 87% 87% 86% 86% 92% 96% 
Household size 6 5 6 5 7 6 
Members age 0-5 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Members age 6-12 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Members age 13-18 1* 0* 1 0 1 1 
Members age 19-35 1* 1* 1 1 1 1 
Members age 36-55 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Members age 56-69 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Members 70+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kilometers to food market  29 37 30 36 20 39 
       
Percent from each district 
Kaputa 20% 29% 15% 25% 74% 60% 
Kalabo  44% 46% 46% 49% 26% 24% 
Shang’ombo 36% 25% 39% 26% <1% 16% 
1All samples restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012. Means and tests for significant difference are regression-adjusted to account for clustered 
randomized design. Monthly per capita food consumption and food security regressions include controls for recipient characteristics (age, education, marital 
status), household characteristics (wealth, household size, and demographic composition), district fixed effects, and a vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, 
rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap). *** indicates significant differences between the treatment and control groups at the 99% level, ** at the 
95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
 
 
 
 100 
Table 17. Mean characteristics and tests for equivalence between control and treatment groups at 2010 baseline amongst 
households within 10km of a market 1 
 Panel households, 
 all 
Panel households, 
 2010 fuelwood >0 
Panel households, 
 2010 charcoal >0 
 Treatment 
(n=575) 
Control 
(n=522) 
Treatment 
(n=521) 
Control 
(n=471) 
Treatment 
(n=49) 
Control 
(n=23) 
Recipient characteristics 
Age  30 29 30 29 32 32 
Attended school  72% 70% 72% 69% 88% 87% 
Married  71% 74% 72% 76% 65% 65% 
Male <1% <1% <1% <1% 6% <1% 
       
Household characteristics 
Wealth index 0.19 0.12 0.09 0.09 1.39 1.02 
Below 2010 poverty line  93% 94% 93% 94% 88% 100% 
Monthly per capita food consumption (kwacha) 32.34 29.54 31.54 29.51 40.95 28.28 
Severely food insecure 93% 93% 93% 93% 94% 91% 
Household size 6 6 6 6 7 7 
Members age 0-5 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Members age 6-12 1 1 1 1 2 2 
Members age 13-18 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Members age 19-35 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Members age 36-55 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Members age 56-69 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Members 70+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kilometers to food market  3 4 3 4 2 4 
       
Percent from each district 
Kaputa 39% 30% 36% 27% 71% 78% 
Kalabo  27% 23% 27% 22% 27% 4% 
Shang’ombo 34% 48% 36% 51% 2% 17% 
1All samples restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012. Means and tests for significant difference are regression-adjusted to account for clustered 
randomized design. Monthly per capita food consumption and food security regressions include controls for recipient characteristics (age, education, marital 
status), household characteristics (wealth, household size, and demographic composition), district fixed effects, and a vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, 
rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap). *** indicates significant differences between the treatment and control groups at the 99% level, ** at the 
95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
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Table 18. The decision to farm and land area used in 2012 
 Treatment 
(n=1,153) 
Control 
(n=1,145) 
   
Used land for farming 1,042 (90%) 
995 
(87%) 
   
Total area farmed (ha)   
   Mean 0.85 0.63 
   Maximum 10.4 11.5 
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Table 19. Types of non-farm businesses owned in 2012 
 Treatment 
(n=1,153) 
Control 
(n=1,145) 
   
Own a non-farm business 541 (47%) 
344 
(30%) 
   
Own a natural resource-based business 189 (16%) 
119 
(10%) 
   Fishing  167 (14%) 
102 
(9%) 
   Charcoal 23 (2%) 
13 
(1%) 
   Hay  4 (<1%) 
4 
(<1%) 
   
Own a business not based on natural resources 377 (33%) 
233 
(20%) 
   Home brewery 135 (12%) 
95 
(8%) 
   Petty trader 83 (7%) 
49 
(4%) 
   Food preparation 27 (2%) 
14 
(1%) 
   Crafts 19 (2%) 
21 
(2%) 
   Grocery store 11 (<1%) 
3 
(<1%) 
   Carpentry 7 (<1%) 
6 
(1%) 
   Other 121 (10%) 
57 
(5%) 
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Table 20. Natural resource use at 2010 baseline: Means and tests for equivalence between control and treatment groups1 
 Panel households, 
all 
Fuelwood 
consumption >0 
Charcoal 
consumption >0 
Bushmeat consumption 
>0 
 Treatment 
(n=1,135) 
Control 
(n=1,124) 
Treatment 
(n=1,031) 
Control 
(n=1,014) 
Treatment 
(n=73) 
Control 
(n=48) 
Treatment 
(n=23) 
Control 
(n=22) 
Fuelwood 
Percent consuming 91% 90% - - - - - - 
         
Monthly per capita 
consumption 
(kwacha) 
- - 5.36 5.12 - - - - 
         
Charcoal 
Percent consuming 6% 4% - - - - - - 
         
Monthly per capita 
consumption 
(kwacha) 
- - - - 3.59 3.50 - - 
         
Bushmeat 
Percent consuming 2% 2% - - - - - - 
         
2 weeks per capita 
consumption 
(kwacha) 
- - - - - - 2.81 4.67 
1Means and tests for significant difference are regression-adjusted to account for clustered randomized design. Regressions include controls for recipient 
characteristics (age, education, marital status), household characteristics (wealth, household size, and demographic composition), district fixed effects, and a 
vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap). *** indicates significant differences between the treatment and 
control groups at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
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Table 21. Natural resource use at 2010 baseline: Means and tests for equivalence between control and treatment groups 
amongst households more than 10km from a market1 
 Panel households, 
all 
Fuelwood 
consumption >0 
Charcoal 
consumption >0 
 Treatment 
(n=566) 
Control 
(n=613) 
Treatment 
(n=513) 
Control 
(n=552) 
Treatment 
(n=25) 
Control 
(n=25) 
Fuelwood 
Percent consuming 91% 90% - - - - 
       
Monthly per capita consumption 
(kwacha) - - 5.13 5.00 - - 
       
Charcoal 
Percent consuming 4% 4% - - - - 
       
Monthly per capita consumption 
(kwacha) - - - - 3.98 3.89 
1Means and tests for significant difference are regression-adjusted to account for clustered randomized design. Regressions include controls for recipient 
characteristics (age, education, marital status), household characteristics (wealth, household size, and demographic composition), district fixed effects, and a 
vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap). *** indicates significant differences between the treatment and 
control groups at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
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Table 22. Natural resource use at 2010 baseline: Means and tests for equivalence between control and treatment groups 
amongst households within 10km of a market1 
 Panel households, 
all 
Fuelwood 
 consumption >0 
Charcoal 
consumption >0 
 Treatment 
(n=569) 
Control 
(n=511) 
Treatment 
(n=518) 
Control 
(n=462) 
Treatment 
(n=48) 
Control 
(n=23) 
Fuelwood 
Percent consuming 91% 90% - - - - 
       
Monthly per capita consumption 
(kwacha) - - 5.61 5.31 - - 
       
Charcoal 
Percent consuming 8% 5% - - - - 
       
Monthly per capita consumption 
(kwacha) - - - - 3.61 3.55 
1Means and tests for significant difference are regression-adjusted to account for clustered randomized design. Regressions include controls for recipient 
characteristics (age, education, marital status), household characteristics (wealth, household size, and demographic composition), district fixed effects, and a 
vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap). *** indicates significant differences between the treatment and 
control groups at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
 
 
 
 106 
Table 23. The impact of cash on use of fuelwood, charcoal, bushmeat and land for 
farming1,2  
Dependent variable: Consumed resource (1) – Linear Probability Model  
     
 Used fuelwood Used charcoal Used bushmeat Used land for farming 
Constant 1.08*** 
(0.08) 
-0.14* 
(0.08) 
-0.16*** 
(0.05) 
0.59*** 
(0.09) 
Time -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) -- 
Cash 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Cash*Time -0.04 
(0.02) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) -- 
     
Recipient characteristics     
Age -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0006) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Attended school 0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
2.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Married 0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.018 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
    
Household characteristics    
Wealth index -0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.004) 
-0.02** 
(0.01)   
Household size -0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.02)   
Members age 0-5 0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
Members age 6-12 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
Members age 13-18 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
Members age 19-35 -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04* 
(0.03) 
Members age 36-55 -0.003 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
     
Community characteristics    
Kaputa -0.14*** 
(0.03) 
0.22*** 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.04) 
Shangombo 0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
     
N 4518 4518 4518 2259 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
2Baseline data for land use not available; first difference regressions using just 2012 data assume equivalence at 
baseline. 
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Table 24. The impact of cash on charcoal and bushmeat consumption in Kaputa district1,2 
Dependent variable: Consumed resource (1) – Linear Probability Model 
   
 Used charcoal Used bushmeat 
Constant 0.01 
(0.20) 
-0.20* 
(0.10) 
Time 0.22*** 
(.05) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Cash 0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Cash*Time 0.24*** 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
   
Recipient characteristics   
Age -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.00002 
(0.001) 
Attended school -0.02 
(0.04) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Married -0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
  
Household characteristics  
Wealth index 0.10*** 
(0.02) 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
Household size 0.01 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Members age 0-5 -0.04 
(0.04) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
Members age 6-12 0.002 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Members age 13-18 -0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Members age 19-35 0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Members age 36-55 0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
   
N 1314 1314 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level 
2Sub-samples balanced at baseline (regression results not shown). 
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Table 25. The impact of cash on consumption of fuelwood, charcoal, and land amongst 
households with consumption at baseline (fuelwood, charcoal) or in 2012 (land)1,2 
Dependent variable: Per capita consumption (logged)  
    
 Fuelwood, 
monthly 
(kwacha) 
Charcoal, 
monthly 
(kwacha) 
Land used for farming 
(hectares) 
Constant 9.59*** 
(0.61) 
2.40 
(2.97) 
-2.76*** 
(0.35) 
Time -1.10*** 
(0.22) 
-7.94*** 
(1.32) 
 
- 
Cash 0.00003 
(0.12) 
-0.68 
(0.95) 
0.27*** 
(0.08) 
Cash*Time -0.35 
(0.30) 
2.02 
(1.67) 
- 
 
    
Recipient characteristics    
Age -0.01 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.04) 
0.01** 
(0.003) 
Attended school 0.05 
(0.11) 
0.39 
(0.68) 
0.18*** 
(0.05) 
Married 0.15 
(0.15) 
-0.18 
(0.69) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
   
Household characteristics   
Wealth index -0.13* 
(0.06) 
0.43** 
(0.17) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Household size -0.09 
(0.19) 
-0.003 
(0.90) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
Members age 0-5 -0.02 
(0.19) 
-0.28 
(0.84) 
0.002 
(0.08) 
Members age 6-12 -0.09 
(.19) 
-0.003 
(0.84) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
Members age 13-18 -0.001 
(0.20) 
0.17 
(0.91) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
Members age 19-35 -0.12 
(0.19) 
0.47 
(1.08) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
Members age 36-55 0.06 
(0.18) 
-0.06 
(0.98) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
    
Community characteristics   
Kaputa -1.07*** 
(0.29) 
0.66 
(1.10)   
0.06 
(0.13) 
Shangombo 0.04 
(0.17) 
-1.05 
(1.08) 
0.57*** 
(0.10) 
    
N 4076 240 2259 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level 
2Baseline data for land use not available; first difference regressions using just 2012 data assume equivalence at 
baseline. 
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Table 26. The impact of cash on use of fuelwood, charcoal, and land within 10km of a 
market1,2  
Dependent variable: Consumed resource (1) – Linear Probability Model  
    
 Used fuelwood Used charcoal Used land for farming 
Constant 0.99*** 
(0.13) 
-0.19 
(0.11) 
0.47***  
(0.14) 
Time -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.10*** 
0.04 -- 
Cash 0.01 
(0.03) 
(0.01) 
0.04 
0.001 
(0.03) 
Cash*Time -0.05 
(0.03) 
0.11* 
(0.07) -- 
    
Recipient characteristics    
Age -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Attended school 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
Married 0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.03) 
   
Household characteristics   
Wealth index -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
Household size 0.002 
(0.02) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Members age 0-5 -0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
Members age 6-12 -0.004 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Members age 13-18 -0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02)   
0.04 
(0.04) 
Members age 19-35 -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
Members age 36-55 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
    
Community characteristics   
Kaputa -0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.23*** 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
Shangombo 0.06* 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
    
N 2160 2160 1080 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level 
2Baseline data for land use not available; first difference regressions using just 2012 data assume equivalence at 
baseline. 
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Table 27. The impact of cash on consumption of fuelwood and land amongst households 
with consumption at baseline (fuelwood) or 2012 (land) within 10km of a market1,2  
Dependent variable: Per capita consumption (logged) 
   
 Fuelwood, monthly 
(kwacha) 
Land used for farming 
(hectares) 
Constant 8.98*** 
(1.11) 
-2.03*** 
(0.41) 
Time -1.07*** 
(0.29) -- 
Cash 0.15 
(0.14) 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
Cash*Time -0.63 
(0.39) -- 
   
Recipient characteristics   
Age -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.0004 
(0.003) 
Attended school 0.06 
(0.16) 
0.17*** 
(0.05) 
Married 0.17 
(0.22) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
  
Household characteristics  
Wealth index -0.20** 
(0.08) 
0.07*** 
(0.03) 
Household size -0.02 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
Members age 0-5 -0.21 
(0.29) 
-0.17* 
(0.09) 
Members age 6-12 -0.24 
(0.28) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
Members age 13-18 -0.14 
(0.30) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
Members age 19-35 -0.25 
(0.28) 
-0.14 
(0.09) 
Members age 36-55 0.18 
(0.25) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
   
Community characteristics  
Kaputa -0.80** 
(0.32) 
0.18  
(0.12) 
Shangombo 0.20 
(0.28) 
0.48*** 
(0.11) 
   
N 1953 925 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level 
2Baseline data for land use not available; first difference regressions using just 2012 data assume equivalence at 
baseline. 
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Table 28. The impact of cash on use of fuelwood, charcoal, and land more than 10km from 
a market1,2  
Dependent variable: Consumed resource (1) – Linear Probability Model  
    
 Used fuelwood Used charcoal Used land for farming 
Constant 1.16*** 
(0.11) 
-0.19* 
(0.10) 
0.72*** 
(0.11) 
Time -.011 
(0.03) 
0.05** 
(0.03) -- 
Cash 0.002 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
Cash*Time -0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.05) -- 
    
Recipient characteristics    
Age -0.0002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Attended school -0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Married 0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
   
Household characteristics   
Wealth index -0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Household size -0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Members age 0-5 0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Members age 6-12 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Members age 13-18 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Members age 19-35 -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Members age 36-55 -0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
    
Community characteristics   
Kaputa -0.21*** 
(0.05) 
0.22*** 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Shangombo 0.004 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.10*** 
(0.02) 
    
N 2358 2358 1179 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level 
2Baseline data for land use not available; first difference regressions using just 2012 data assume equivalence at 
baseline. 
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Table 29. The impact of cash on consumption of fuelwood and land amongst households 
with consumption at baseline (fuelwood) or 2012 (land) more than 10km from a market1,2  
Dependent variable: Per capita consumption (logged) 
   
 Fuelwood, monthly 
(kwacha) 
Land used for farming 
(hectares) 
Constant 9.98*** 
(0.86) 
-1.32*** 
(0.31) 
Time -1.12*** 
(0.28) -- 
Cash -0.03 
(0.18) 
0.28*** 
(0.08) 
Cash*Time -0.07 
(0.43) -- 
   
Recipient characteristics   
Age -0.002 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Attended school -0.02 
(0.16) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
Married 0.11 
(0.15) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
  
Household characteristics  
Wealth index 0.10 
(0.08) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
Household size -0.16 
(0.21) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
Members age 0-5 0.15 
(0.21) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
Members age 6-12 0.02 
(0.22) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
Members age 13-18 0.14 
(0.21) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
Members age 19-35 0.04 
(0.23) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
Members age 36-55 -0.04 
(0.24) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
   
Community characteristics  
Kaputa -1.44*** 
(0.40) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
Shangombo -0.17 
(0.19) 
0.44*** 
(0.12) 
   
N 2123 1078 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level 
2Baseline data for land use not available; first difference regressions using just 2012 data assume equivalence at 
baseline. 
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Table 30. The impact of cash on household ownership of non-farm businesses1,2 
Dependent variable: Own business (1) – Linear Probability Model  
    
 Any non-farm 
business 
Charcoal, fish, or 
hay business 
All other 
businesses 
Constant 0.77*** 
(0.13) 
0.18* 
(0.10) 
0.64*** 
(0.10) 
Cash 0.17*** 
(0.03) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
    
Recipient characteristics    
Age -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Attended school 0.065** 
(0.023) 
0.04*** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Married -0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.04* 
(0.03) 
   
Household characteristics   
Wealth index 0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Household size -0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Members age 0-5 0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Members age 6-12 0.05 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Members age 13-18 0.04 
(0.03) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Members age 19-35 0.03 
(0.04) 
.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Members age 36-55 0.03 
(0.04) 
.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
    
Community characteristics   
Kaputa -0.04 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.11*** 
(0.04) 
Shangombo -0.19*** 
(0.04) 
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
    
N 2252 2252 2252 
1Sample restricted to 2012 data; robust standard errors are clustered at the community level to account for the 
clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. Parameter estimates for vector of 
baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap) not shown. *** indicates 
significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
2Baseline business enterprise data not available; first difference regressions using just 2012 data assume equivalence 
at baseline. 
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Table 31. The impact of cash on ownership of non-farm businesses more than 10km from a 
market 
Dependent variable: Own business (1) – Linear Probability Model  
    
 Any non-farm 
business 
Charcoal, fish, or 
hay business 
All other 
businesses 
Constant 0.81*** 
(0.14) 
0.16 
(0.12) 
0.69*** 
(0.12) 
Cash 0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
    
Recipient characteristics    
Age -0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.00004 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Attended school 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Married -0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
   
Household characteristics   
Wealth index 0.03 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Household size -0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
Members age 0-5 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
Members age 6-12 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.003 
(0.05) 
Members age 13-18 0.05 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
Members age 19-35 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
Members age 36-55 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.005 
(0.05) 
    
Community characteristics   
Kaputa -0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.005 
(0.04) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
Shangombo -0.25*** 
(0.04) 
-0.14*** 
(0.03) 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
    
N 1175 1175 1175 
1Sample restricted to 2012 data; robust standard errors are clustered at the community level to account for the 
clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. Parameter estimates for vector of 
baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap) not shown. *** indicates 
significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
2Baseline business enterprise data not available; first difference regressions using just 2012 data assume equivalence 
at baseline. 
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Table 32. The impact of cash on ownership of non-farm businesses within 10km of a 
market1,2 
Dependent variable: Own business (1) – Linear Probability Model  
    
 Any non-farm 
business 
Charcoal, fish, or 
hay business 
All other 
businesses 
Constant 0.62** 
(0.24) 
0.27 
(0.19) 
0.43** 
(0.20) 
Cash 0.23*** 
(0.05) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
    
Recipient characteristics    
Age -0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
Attended school 0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
Married -0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
   
Household characteristics   
Wealth index 0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Household size -0.02 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
Members age 0-5 0.05 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
Members age 6-12 0.03 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
Members age 13-18 0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
Members age 19-35 0.03 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
Members age 36-55 0.04 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
    
Community characteristics   
Kaputa 0.03 
(0.07) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
Shangombo -0.11 
(0.08) 
-0.10 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
    
N 1077 1077 1077 
1Sample restricted to 2012 data; robust standard errors are clustered at the community level to account for the 
clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. Parameter estimates for vector of 
baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap) not shown. *** indicates 
significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level.  
2Baseline business enterprise data not available; first difference regressions using just 2012 data assume equivalence 
at baseline. 
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Table 33. The impact of cash on the decision to farm, amongst households with a non-farm 
business1,2 
Dependent variable: Used land for farming (1) – Linear Probability Model 
    
 All 2012 
households 
Households more than 
10km from a market 
Households within 
10km of a market 
Constant 0.50*** 
(0.17) 
0.74*** 
(0.19) 
0.30 
(0.31) 
Cash 0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
    
Recipient characteristics 
Age 0.0003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Attended school -0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.0003 
(0.06) 
Married 0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
    
Household characteristics 
Wealth index -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Household size -0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
Members age 0-5 0.04 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
Members age 6-12 0.02 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.005 
(0.07) 
Members age 13-18 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
Members age 19-35 0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.002 
(0.07) 
Members age 36-55 0.04 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
    
Community characteristics 
Kaputa 0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
Shangombo 0.03 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
    
N 870 413 457 
1Sample restricted to 2012 data; robust standard errors are clustered at the community level to account for the 
clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. Parameter estimates for vector of 
baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap) not shown. *** indicates 
significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
2Baseline business enterprise data not available; first difference regressions using just 2012 data assume equivalence 
at baseline. 
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Table 34. The impact of cash on the area farmed, amongst farming households with a non-
farm business1,2 
Dependent variable: Hectares farmed (Logged, per capita)  
    
 All 2012 
households 
Households more than 
10km from a market 
Households within 
10km of a market 
Constant -1.73*** 
(0.30) 
-1.62*** 
(0.43) 
-1.85*** 
(0.60) 
Cash 0.13* 
(0.07) 
0.20* 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
    
Recipient characteristics 
Age -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.005) 
Attended school 0.03 
(0.06) 
0.004 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
Married 0.01 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
    
Household characteristics 
Wealth index 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Household size 0.14 
(0.13) 
0.16 
(0.20) 
0.16 
(0.15) 
Members age 0-5 -0.23* 
(0.12) 
-0.31* 
(0.18) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
Members age 6-12 -0.26** 
(0.12) 
-0.26 
(0.16) 
-0.31* 
(0.16) 
Members age 13-18 -0.16 
(0.13) 
-0.16 
(0.19) 
-0.21 
(0.17) 
Members age 19-35 -0.28** 
(0.12) 
-0.33* 
(0.17) 
-0.30** 
(0.15) 
Members age 36-55 -0.19* 
(0.11) 
-0.30* 
(0.17) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
    
Community characteristics 
Kaputa 0.08 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
0.33** 
(0.14) 
Shangombo 0.53*** 
(0.11) 
0.48*** 
(0.15) 
0.71*** 
(0.16) 
    
N 721 366 355 
1Sample restricted to 2012 households with farmed area greater than zero; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
2Baseline business enterprise data not available; first difference regressions using just 2012 data assume equivalence 
at baseline. 
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                             Table 35. Bike ownership trends1 
 Cash 
(n=1,153) 
Control 
(n=1,145) 
 
2010 80 
(7%) 
87 
(8%) 
 
2012 195 
(17%) 
144 
(13%) 
     1 Restricted to households that remain in the panel 
 
 
 
Table 36. Mean characteristics and tests for equivalence at 2010 baseline between (a) those 
ever owning a bike and those never owning a bike and (b) the cash transfer group and the 
control group1,2 
 Cash vs. Control Bike ever vs. Bike never 
 Cash (n=1,153) 
Control 
(n=1,145) 
Bike ever 
(n=430) 
Bike never 
(n=1868) 
Recipient characteristics  
Age 30 30 31**          30**            
Attended school 73% 70% 84%*** 69%***            
Married 74% 71% 86%**          69%**            
Male 1.2% <1% <1%**          2%**            
     
Household characteristics  
Monthly per capita 
consumption (kwacha) 48.11 46.09 49.38*** 46.57***     
Monthly per capita food 
consumption (kwacha) 30.16 28.50 36.30**   35.13**     
Below 2010 poverty line 92% 92% 90%            92%            
Severely food insecure 90% 90% 89%     90%     
Household size 6 6 7***         5***            
Members age 0-5 2 2 2*** 2***            
Members age 6-12 1 1 2***         1***            
Members age 13-18 1 1 1***         1***            
Members age 19-35 1 1 1*           *1            
Members age 36-55 1 1 1***         0***            
Members age 56-69 0 0 0            0            
Members 70+ 0 0 0            0 
Kilometers to market 16 22 14**          20**            
     
Percent from each district  
Kaputa 30% 30% 68%***         21%***            
Kalabo 35% 35% 19%***         40%***            
Shang’ombo 35% 35% 13%***         39%***            
1All samples restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012. Means and tests for significant difference 
are regression-adjusted to account for clustered randomized design. Consumption and food security regressions 
include controls for recipient characteristics (age, education, marital status), household characteristics (household 
size and demographic composition), district fixed effects, and a vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, 
fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap). *** indicates significant differences between the treatment and control 
groups at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
2Monthly per capita consumption does not include spending on agricultural inputs. 
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Table 37. Agricultural market activity at 2010 baseline: Means and tests for equivalence 
between the cash and control group1,2 
 Panel households, 
all 
Agricultural input 
spending > 0 
Crop Sales > 0 
 Cash 
(n=1,153) 
Control 
(n=1,145) 
Cash 
(n=157) 
Control 
(n=150) 
Cash 
(n=227) 
Control 
(n=275) 
Agricultural inputs   
Percent 
consuming 14%     13% - - - - 
       
Spending 
during prior 
agricultural 
season/year 
(kwacha) 
- - 53.06* 49.19* - - 
       
Crop sales   
Percent 
selling 20% 24% - - - - 
       
Value of sales 
during prior 
agricultural 
season/year 
(kwacha) 
- - - - 326.04 271.03 
       
1Means and tests for significant difference are regression-adjusted to account for clustered randomized design. 
Regressions include controls for recipient characteristics (age, education, marital status), household characteristics   
(household size and demographic composition), district fixed effects, and a vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, 
rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap). *** indicates significant differences between the treatment 
and control groups at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
2Agricultural inputs include seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides. 
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Table 38. Agricultural market activity at 2010 baseline: Means and tests for equivalence 
between those ever owning bikes and those never owning bikes1,2 
 Panel households, 
all 
Agricultural input 
spending > 0 
Crop Sales > 0 
 Bike ever 
(n=430) 
Bike never 
(n=1,868) 
Bike ever 
(n=84) 
Bike never 
(n=223) 
Bike ever 
(n=149) 
Bike never 
(n=353) 
Agricultural inputs   
Percent 
consuming 20%* 12%* - - - - 
       
Spending 
during prior 
agricultural 
season/year 
(kwacha) 
- - 70.89 44.01 - - 
       
Crop sales   
Percent  
selling 35%** 19%** - - - - 
       
Value of sales 
during prior 
agricultural 
season/year 
(kwacha) 
- - - - 327.48 282.93 
       
1Means and tests for significant difference are regression-adjusted to account for clustered randomized design. 
Regressions include controls for recipient characteristics (age, education, marital status), household characteristics   
(household size and demographic composition), district fixed effects, and a vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, 
rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid soap). *** indicates significant differences between the treatment 
and control groups at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
2Agricultural inputs include seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides.
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Table 39. The impact of cash and bikes on engagement in agricultural markets and non-farm business1,2 
Dependent variable: Engaged in market activity (1) – Linear Probability Model  
       
 Sold crops Purchased agricultural inputs Owned non-farm business 
 Baseline 
bike 
Time-varying 
bike 
Baseline 
bike 
Time-varying 
bike 
Baseline 
bike 
Time-varying 
bike 
Constant 0.13 
(0.11)      
0.13 
(0.11)      
0.24***   
(0.08)      
0.24***   
(0.08)      
0.82***   
(0.12)      
0.82***    
(0.12)      
Time -0.01   
(0.03)     
-0.01 
(0.03)     
0.06**   
(0.03)      
0.04* 
(0.02)     
- - 
Cash -0.03   
(0.03)     
-0.03 
(0.03)     
0.01 
(0.02)      
0.01    
(0.02) 
0.15***   
(0.03)      
0.14***    
(0.03)      
Cash*Time 0.12***   
(0.04)      
0.12***   
(0.04)      
0.11***   
(0.04)      
0.12***   
(0.04)      
- - 
Bike 0.14**   
(0.06)      
0.14**   
(0.06)      
0.02 
(0.04)      
0.02    
(0.04)      
-0.05   
(0.05)     
-0.02    
(0.05)    
Bike*Time 0.01 
(0.07)      
-0.01 
(0.06)     
0.02 
(0.06)      
0.12*    
(0.07)      
- - 
Bike*Cash -0.06    
(0.08)     
-0.06 
(0.08)     
-0.03   
(0.06)     
-0.03    
(0.06)     
0.11 
(0.08)     
0.09    
(0.07)      
Bike*Cash*Time -0.10   
(0.11)     
-0.02 
(0.08)     
0.05 
(0.09)      
-0.05     
(0.09)    
- - 
       
Recipient characteristics       
Age 0.001   
(0.001)      
0.001   
(0.001)      
0.0002   
(0.001)      
0.0003  
(0.001)      
-0.004***   
(0.001)     
0.06*    
(0.03)      
Attended school 0.08***   
(0.02)      
0.08***   
(0.02)     
0.02* 
(0.01)      
0.02    
(0.01)      
0.06**   
(0.03)      
0.06**    
(0.03)      
Married 0.04**   
(0.02)      
0.04**   
(0.02)      
0.06***   
(0.02)      
0.05***   
(0.02)      
-0.02   
(0.03)     
-0.03    
(0.02)    
       
Household characteristics       
Household size 0.02 
(0.02)      
0.01 
(0.02)      
-0.03   
(0.02)     
-0.03*    
(0.02)     
-0.03   
(0.03)     
-0.03    
(0.03)     
Members age 0-5 -0.01   
(0.03)     
-0.01    
(0.03)     
0.02 
(0.02)      
0.03    
(0.02)      
0.06*   
(0.03)     
0.06*    
(0.03)      
Members age 6-12 -0.02   
(0.02)     
-0.016   
(0.02)     
0.03 
(0.02)      
0.03    
(0.02)      
0.04 
(0.03)     
0.04    
(0.03)     
Members age 13-18 -0.002   
(0.03)     
-0.001   
(0.03)     
0.04**   
(0.02)      
0.05**    
(0.02)      
0.04 
(0.03)     
0.04    
(0.03)     
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Members age 19-35 -0.02   
(0.02)     
-0.01    
(0.02)     
0.03 
(0.02)     
0.04*    
(0.02)      
0.03 
 (0.04)      
0.03    
(0.04)      
Members age 36-55 -0.02   
(0.02)     
-0.02    
(0.02)     
0.05**   
(0.02)      
0.05**    
(0.02)      
0.03 
(0.04)      
0.03    
(0.04)      
Kilometers to market (logged) 0.03**   
(0.01)      
0.03**   
(0.01)      
0.01 
(0.01)      
0.01    
(0.01)      
-0.03*   
(0.01)    
-0.02*     
(0.01)     
       
Community characteristics       
Kaputa 0.04 
(0.03)      
0.03    
(0.03)      
0.02 
(0.03)      
0.01    
(0.03)      
-0.03   
(0.04)    
-0.04    
(0.04)     
Shangombo -0.07**   
(0.03)     
-0.07**   
(0.03)     
-0.06**   
(0.03)     
-0.06**   
(0.03)     
-0.21***   
(0.04)     
-0.21***   
(0.04)    
       
N 4584 4584 4584 4584 2284 2284 
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the community level to account for the clustered 
randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, 
salt, hand soap, liquid soap) not shown. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
2Baseline data for non-farm business not available; first difference regressions using just 2012 data assume equivalence at baseline.
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Table 40. The impact of cash and bikes on crop sales and agricultural input purchases, 
amongst those with such activity at baseline1 
Dependent variable: Value sold/purchased during prior agricultural season/year (kwacha) 
     
 Value of crops sold, 
amongst those with sales 
at baseline 
Value of agricultural inputs 
purchased, amongst those with 
spending at baseline 
 Baseline 
 bike 
Time-varying 
bike 
Baseline 
 bike 
Time-varying 
bike 
Constant 141.09    
(120.23)     
137.89   
(122.17)      
46.58    
(35.53)      
41.19     
(35.64)      
Time -105.1**   
(440.94)     
-147.41***   
(35.13)     
-27.64***   
(8.42)     
-30.96***    
(8.31)     
Cash 313.20    
(85.71)      
32.20    
(85.61)      
-9.14    
(7.78)     
-9.34    
(7.67)     
Cash*Time 31.19    
(97.34)      
18.41    
(79.90)      
19.17    
(12.18)      
11.38    
(10.34)      
Bike 55.64    
(106.34)      
69.17   
(108.84)      
2.65    
(16.59)      
5.90    
(16.63)      
Bike*Time 251.86     
(159.45)      
331.26**   
(164.32)      
17.69    
(29.59)      
25.14    
(31.72)      
Bike*Cash 62.11 
   (212.89)      
69.41   
(209.09)      
77.11*   
(42.73)      
76.31*    
(41.91)      
Bike*Cash*Time -127.78    
(248.11)     
-146.53   
(309.47)     
-50.30   
(52.66)    
-43.43    
(53.92)     
     
Recipient characteristics     
Age  -20.72    
(76.64)     
-1.78     
(2.40)     
-0.093    
(0.41)     
14.51    
(0.42)      
Attended school 113.04**   
(44.25)      
99.36**   
(41.02)      
16.52*    
(9.67)      
14.88*    
(8.76)      
Married 73.40       
(67.47)      
61.08    
(69.93)      
2572    
(9.64)      
2.34    
(9.46)      
     
Household characteristics     
Household size 44.73    
(76.01)      
36.39    
(70.73)      
17.94    
(20.15)      
18.15    
(19.97)      
Members age 0-5 -20.72    
(76.64)     
-10.73   
(71.19)     
-15.02   
(21.03)     
-13.22    
(20.66)     
Members age 6-12 4.21    
(84.97)      
5.08    
(80.58)      
-17.44   
(20.77)     
-17.42    
(20.51)     
Members age 13-18   20.52    
(75.71)      
24.13    
(70.61)      
-12.23   
(22.07)     
-14.20    
(21.63)     
Members age 19-35 3.619    
(67.64)      
14.46     
(68.59)      
-16.34    
(21.20)     
-17.70    
(21.27)     
Members age 36-55 33.730    
(63.12)      
40.20    
(63.18)      
-11.42   
(19.66)     
-13.25    
(19.78)     
Kilometers to market (logged) -10.35    
(159.12)     
-2.44    
(17.14) 
-1.77    
(2.96)     
-1.13    
(3.04)     
     
Community characteristics     
Kaputa -78.89    
(72.28)     
-110.84   
(70.87)     
19.74    
(14.33)      
10.84    
(13.04)      
Shangombo -16.66    
(126.26)     
-10.44    
(126.95)     
6.17    
(9.64)      
5.07    
(9.27)      
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N 1000 1000 612 612 
     
1Sample restricted to those who remain in the panel survey in 2012; robust standard errors are clustered at the 
community level to account for the clustered randomized design and included in parentheses below coefficients. 
Parameter estimates for vector of baselines prices (maize/grain, rice, beans, fish, oil, sugar, salt, hand soap, liquid 
soap) not shown. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
 
 
Table 41. Impact of bikes and cash on crop sales (kwacha): triple-difference model using 
time-varying measure of bike ownership1 
 2010 
(n=500) 
2012 
(n=500) 
1st difference 
(2012-2010) 
Cash 
(n=226 in 2010; 
 226 in 2012) 
 
(B0 + Cash) 
170.09 
(169.69) 
 
(B0 + Cash + Time + CashTime) 
41.10 
(127.77) 
 
(Time + CashTime) 
-128.10* 
(71.63) 
Bike 
(n=63 in 2010; 
 117 in 2012) 
 
(B0 + Bike) 
207.06 
(155.57) 
 
(B0 + Bike + Time + BikeTime) 
390.91* 
(199.87) 
 
(Time + BikeTime) 
183.85 
(168.96) 
Control 
(no cash, no bike) 
(n=237 in 2010; 
 216 in 2012) 
 
(B0) 
137.89 
(122.17) 
 
(B0 + Time) 
-9.52 
(124.24) 
 
(Time) 
-147.41*** 
(35.13) 
1st difference 
(cash-control) 
 
DIFFERENCES AT BASELINE 
(Cash) 
32.20 
(85.61) 
 
(Cash + CashTime) 
50.62 
(44.29) 
 
EFFECT OF CASH 
(CashTime) 
18.41 
(79.90) 
1st difference 
(bike-control) 
 
DIFFERENCES AT BASELINE 
(Bike) 
69.17 
(108.84) 
 
(Bike + BikeTime) 
400.43** 
(164.45) 
 
EFFECT OF BIKE 
(BikeTime) 
331.26** 
(164.32) 
Triple difference 
(bike & cash – 
control) 
 
DIFFERENCES AT BASELINE 
(BikeCash) 
69.41 
(209.09) 
 
(BikeCash + BikeCashTime) 
-77.12 
(219.10) 
 
MULTIPLICATIVE EFFECT 
OF CASH AND BIKE 
(BikeCashTime) 
-146.53 
(309.47) 
1Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. *** indicates significant differences at the 99% 
level, ** at the 95% level, and * at the 90% level. 
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Table 42. Location of agricultural market activity in 2012 
 Cash Control Bike No bike 
Location of crop sales     
Village of residence 217 
(64%) 
166 
(68%) 
79 
(60%) 
304 
(68%) 
Neighboring village or closest town 121 
(36%) 
77 
(32%) 
52 
(40%) 
146 
(32%) 
   Total 338 243 131 450 
     
Location of agricultural input purchases     
Village of residence 182 
(54%) 
124 
(57%) 
68 
(54%) 
238 
(56%) 
Neighboring village or closest town 154  
(46%) 
93  
(43%) 
58  
(46%) 
189  
(44%) 
   Total 336 217 126 427 
 
